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This chapter reviews the recent debate about the role of social capital in economics. We argue 
that all the difficulties this concept has encountered in economics are due to a vague and 
excessively broad definition. For this reason, we restrict social capital to the set of values and 
beliefs that help cooperation—which for clarity we label civic capital.   We argue that this 
definition differentiates social capital from human capital and satisfies the properties of the 
standard notion of capital. We then argue that civic capital can explain why differences in 
economic performance persist over centuries and discuss how the effect of civic capital can be 
distinguished empirically from other variables that affect economic performance and its 
persistence, including institutions and geography. 
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Introduction  
Since its introduction by Bourdieu in 1972, the term ‘social capital’ has gained wide acceptance 
in social sciences, and economics, in particular. Economists have used social capital to explain 
an impressive range of phenomena: economic growth (Knack and Keefer 1996), size of firms 
(La Porta et al. 1997; Bloom et al., 2009), institution’s design and performance (Djankov et al, 
2003), financial development (Guiso et al. (GSZ henceforth) 2004, 2008),  crime (Glaeser et al. 
1995), the power of the family (Alesina and Giuliano 2007), innovation (Fountain 1997), and the 
spread of secondary education (Goldin and Katz 2001). This list touches only a very minor 
subset of the topics that have been linked to social capital. NEP, a weekly announcement service 
of new economic papers, shows that every couple of weeks between 20 and 30 new papers come 
out that directly or indirectly rely on social capital to explain some economic phenomenon, for a 
total of 600 papers in 2008!
1  
However, this success has been achieved at the cost of a lot of ambiguity in the use of the 
term. From time to time, social capital has been identified as "the aggregate of the actual or 
potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less 
institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition” (Bourdieu, 1985) and 
“features of social life—networks, norms, and trust—that enable participants to act together 
more effectively to pursue shared objectives” (Putnam, 1990). This ambiguity has also fostered 
very different views of the ultimate role played by social capital in society. While some, 
including Putnam (1993), identify social capital as necessarily a positive value, others, such as 
Bourdieu, emphasize the negative aspects of social capital, such as its fostering of privileged 
cliques or even gangs.  
In his critique to Fukuyama (1995), Solow (1995) effectively summarizes the weaknesses 
of the current definitions of social capital. “If ‘social capital’ is to be more than a buzzword…- 
he writes - the stock of social capital should somehow be measurable, even inexactly." 
Furthermore, if it has to retain the term ‘capital’, social capital has to have a non negative 
                                                 
1 See http://www.socialcapitalgateway.org/eng-archive2008.html a web site that also provides numerous references 
to the social capital literature and information on initiative and conferences on social capital. Those interested in 
subscribing to NEP can do so at http://lists.repec.org/mailman/listinfo/nep-soc.  3 
 
economic payoff.   In other words, for social capital to continue to be useful in the economic 
discourse we need to abandon this ambiguity and elaborate a definition that distinguishes social 
capital from standard human capital and explains the mechanisms through which social capital 
can be accumulated and depreciated.    
After reviewing why the prevailing definitions of social capital do not fit these criteria, in 
this chapter we introduce a definition of social capital as civic capital, i.e. those persistent and 
shared beliefs and values that help a group overcome the free rider problem in the pursuit of 
socially valuable activities. This definition has several advantages. First, it clearly identifies the 
cultural norms and beliefs that matter: only those that help members of a community to solve 
collective actions problems. As such, social capital has a positive economic payoff. It also 
clarifies why the definition deserves the word “capital”—because it is durable.  Third, as we will 
show not only does this definition satisfy the Solow’s critique, but it can be easily incorporated 
into standard economic models, such as Tabellini (2008).      
 Besides dispensing with the ambiguities of the concept that exist in other definitions, we 
argue and document that our definition can overcome one of the main shortcomings of social 
capital: measurement. Values and beliefs can be measured either through laboratory experiments 
and/or in standard surveys, though not without problems. These social capital measures have 
been widely collected, often by social scientists other than economists, and are now readily 
available for several years and many countries in such popular surveys as the World Values 
Survey, the European Social Survey, the General Social Survey or Eurobarometer. Furthermore, 
in recent years field experiments helped highlight the usefulness of a cultural based definition of 
social capital and lab experiments have contributed in identifying its components.  
 Finally, we argue that civic capital is the missing ingredient in explaining the persistence 
of economic development. Civic capital is both empirically and theoretically correlated with the 
notion of social infrastructure introduced by Hall and Jones (1999) to explain the high labor 
productivity of developed economies. And civic capital is highly persistent, since all the methods 
for its transmission (interfamily transmission, formal education, and socialization) take long 
time. For this reason, communities/countries that, for an historic accident, are rich in civic capital 
enjoy a comparative advantage for very extended periods of time.  4 
 
 The purpose of this chapter is not to review the immense literature on social capital but 
rather to give a new perspective on the concept in a way that is particularly useful to economists. 
Hence, we cannot do justice of even a small number of the many papers written of the topic. 
Durlauf and Fafchamps (2005) provide an excellent critical assessment of the conceptual issues 
that emerge in the social capital literature with a focus on the statistical and empirical problems, 
suggesting some solutions.                 
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 1 discusses various concepts of social 
capital and highlights their limitations, showing why many do not conform to Solow’s 
requirements. In this section we also introduce our new definition of social capital as civic 
capital and explain how it overcomes the common critiques. Section 2 deals with the 
measurement of civic capital and how it can be addressed. Section 3 discusses the origins of 
civic capital and reviews what we know about its formation. Section 4 reviews the debate about 
the effects of civic capital discussing issues of identification that this raises. Finally, Section 5 
concludes with a tentative discussion on how civic capital can be changed and what policies can 
affect its accumulation.        
 
1. Definitions of social capital 
In his critique of Fukuyama (1995), Solow (1995) writes “if 'social capital' is to be more than a 
buzzword, something more than mere relevance or even importance is required. Those cultural 
and social formations should be closely analogous to a stock or inventory, capable of being 
characterized as larger or smaller than another such stock. There needs to be an identifiable 
process of 'investment' that adds to the stock, and possibly a process of 'depreciation' that 
subtracts from it. The stock of social capital should somehow be measurable, even inexactly. 
Observable changes in it should correspond to investment and depreciation (emphasis added).” 
As an analogy with “human capital” Solow would also like the concept of social capital to be 
definable in a way that investment in social capital corresponds to “spending resources now to 
produce an object that will contribute to production (and profit) in the future.” Finally, a new 
term is warranted only if social capital is really distinct from other well-established forms of 
capital, in particular human capital.   5 
 
In this section we will review the most prominent definitions of social capital used by 
sociologists, political scientists, and economists. As we will argue these definitions do not satisfy 
“the Solow criteria” described above.   
 
1.1 The Sociologists’ Definitions  
In sociology, social capital refers to the advantages and opportunities accruing to people through 
membership in certain communities. Bourdieu (1985), credited for having introduced this 
concept, defines social capital as "the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are 
linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual 
acquaintance and recognition" (Bourdieu, 1983).
2 Similarly, Coleman (1990) describes social 
capital as a resource of individuals that emerges from social ties and their belonging to a certain 
community. 
This definition satisfies most of the Solow criteria. An individual can invest in cultivating 
relationships and the value of these relationships can deteriorate over time, if they are not 
maintained (Glaeser et al. (2002)). The stock of these relationships can be (and has been) 
measured (for a review see Wasserman and Faust, 1997) and so can their economic payoff (see 
for example Hochber et al, 2007).  
This definition fails in the “social” dimension.  Bourdieu’s social capital is accumulated 
by individuals, possessed by the individuals, dissipated by individuals. In other words, it is not 
substantially different from the definition of human capital. If we do not consider human capital 
as just the set of notions learned at school, but also as the set of acquaintances, relationships you 
accumulate at school and outside of school—that is if we slightly expand it to include not only 
what you know but also who you know—then the notion of human capital can fully account for 
the notion of social capital championed by Bourdieu.  
Some (e.g., Coleman, 1990) identify the specificity of social capital in the externality 
involved in the investment process. When A invests in a relationship with B also B acquires a 
relationship with A. But this externality is not unique to social capital either. As the modern 
                                                 
2 Coleman instead attributes the introduction to the term to Loury (1977).  6 
 
literature on economic growth points out, even investments in physical capital generate 
important externalities and so do investments in human capital.     
A related definition, endorsed by Coleman (1990) and (at least in part) by Putnam (1993) 
is that social capital is the set of relationships that support effective norms. “Effective norms that 
inhibit crimes in a city make it possible for women to walk freely outside at night and for old 
people to leave their homes without fear.”(Coleman, 1990). In the language of economists, social 
capital is the mechanism of social enforcement (see Spagnolo, 1999).   
In this acceptation, social capital can be both a “good” and a “bad.” As Portes (1998) 
points out, a high level of social capital can lead to exclusion of outsiders and punishment of 
people who deviate from a downward leveling social norm. In many ghettos, for instance, 
individuals seeking to join the middle-class mainstream are subject to continuous verbal attacks 
by the rest of the community (e.g., Bourgois, 1995). This alternative definition of social capital 
fails the Solow’s criteria in many dimensions. First, it is very hard to distinguish inputs from 
outputs. While we can measure the degree of effectiveness of social norms, we cannot easily 
measure the inputs that deliver this outcome. The network of relationships is not sufficient 
because this network is useless if they do not share the same social norm. Hence, the stock of 
social capital so defined should be measured as a combination of the power of the existing 
networks and the strength of shared norms in these networks. We are not aware of any attempt in 
this direction. Second, as Portes (1998) stresses, in this interpretation social capital may become 
a social liability.
3 Finally, it is not clear what investment and depreciation means in this context. 
Is the establishing of new relationship an investment or a disinvestment? It depends. If these 
relationships “close” the network in the sense of Coleman (1990), these investments strengthen 
the norms and so represent an investment. But if they open the network, making its members less 
subject to social pressure, then they represent disinvestment. Furthermore, depending on the 
shared norms and the goal in mind, this “investment” can increase or decrease social welfare. 
Hence, this is not a viable definition from an economic point of view.  
    
                                                 
3 Alternatively, social capital can be an asset for some and a liability for others, as it may be the case with certain 
social clubs with limited membership. Guiso and Zingales (2007) find that social interactions between firms and 
bankers in an exclusive club facilitates access to credit to members but this may come at the expense of restricted 
credit availability for non-members. See also Dessì and Ogilvie (2004) for a similar argument in relation to the 
diffusion of merchant guilds.      7 
 
1.2 The Political Scientists’ definition  
In more recent years, the concept of social capital has been adopted and adapted by political 
scientists like Putnam (1993) and Fukuyama (1995). In their analyses, social capital becomes a 
property of large groups, even nations, rather than individuals. As such it loses any possible 
negative connotation to and it is similar to the concept of civic virtue introduced by Machiavelli. 
This virtue is present in those cities whose inhabitants vote, obey the law, and cooperate with 
each other and whose leaders are honest and committed to the public good (Putnam, 1993 and 
1995).   
Since this is the definition that triggered Solow’s criticisms, it is not surprising that it fails 
Solow’s criteria in many respects. Even in this case, it is very difficult to distinguish inputs from 
outputs. Measuring social capital in terms of the level of cooperation or obedience to the law is 
ambiguous because both these behaviors are also driven by other considerations (economic 
payoff, legal enforcement, etc.) that are difficult to measure with any degree of precision. If 
obedience to the law is stronger in the United States than Brazil even after controlling for 
differences in law enforcement, is it because the United States has more social capital than Brazil 
or because the amount of law enforcement is poorly measured (as is likely to be the case)? This 
definition in terms of outcomes also makes it difficult to determine what is an investment or a 
depreciation in the stock of social capital. If we cannot measure the stock separately from the 
outcome how can we measure accumulation in the stock?   
 
 1.3 Social Capital as Civic Capital   
Building on GSZ (2006)’s definition of culture, we define social capital as those persistent and 
shared beliefs and values that help a group overcome the free rider problem in the pursuit of 
socially valuable activities. This definition is similar to the one advanced by Putnam and 
Fukuyama, but makes it clear that social capital is not about networks or just about values, but 
about values and beliefs, which are shared by a community and persistent over time, often passed 
on to its member through intergenerational transmissions, formal education, or socialization. Our 
definition of social capital is similar to the Almond and Verba (1963) concept of civic culture, 
which they define as “a set of beliefs, attitudes, norms, perceptions and the like, that support 
participation."  Unlike Almond and Verba (1963), however, our definition of civic is not 8 
 
restricted to political participation, but applies more generally to any type of economic 
interaction.  
The greatest advantage of narrowing down the definition is that it makes civic capital 
easily measurable. As we will review below, both beliefs and values can be (and have been) 
measured through surveys and experimental work. Thus, when a community has more (or 
stronger) values that foster cooperation, we can say that the community has more civic capital. 
As we will see in the Tabellini (2007b) model, investment in civic capital is the amount of 
resources that parents spend to teach more cooperative values to their children. A deterioration of 
this set of values can be seen as depreciation of civic capital. 
Since we consider as civic capital only values and beliefs that help a group overcome the 
free rider problem in the pursuit of socially valuable activities, by definition civic capital has a 
non-negative economic payoff. In other words, civic capital purposefully excludes from the 
definitions those values that favor cooperation in socially deviant activities, such as gangs.     
Finally, civic capital so defined is very different from traditional human capital. First, the 
process of investment is social. It is parents and other members of a community that instill values 
and beliefs in an individual, not the individual himself. Second, these values and beliefs do not 
represent civic capital if they are not shared by other members of the community. The set of 
values and beliefs shared by Swedes (which represent the civic capital of the Swedish nation) 
might be a liability if carried by a Swede to Italy. In fact, Butler et. al. (2009) find that because 
cultural beliefs persist, immigrants from high trust countries are more likely to be cheated (and 
lose) than immigrants from low trust countries.      
Our definition of civic capital not only nicely fits Solow’s requirements, but it can also be 
easily incorporated into standard economic models (as did the definition of human capital 
introduced by Becker (1964) and Ben Porath (1967)). In the next sections we are going to see 
some examples.  
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2. Accumulation and depreciation of civic capital   
One of the key requirements for a meaningful economic definition of social capital imposed by 
Solow is the existence of an identifiable process of 'investment' that adds to the stock, and a 
process of 'depreciation' that subtracts from it.   
In this section we discuss how civic capital fulfills this requirement and how the process 
for the accumulation of social capital is consistent with methodological individualism (the 
paradigm of economics) and thus can be easily incorporated in standard economic models. At the 
same time, this discussion will show that the process of accumulating (and depreciating) civic 
capital is different from that of accumulation and depreciation of human capital because it has a 
social dimension to it.  
 
2.1 Civic capital as norms of cooperation: the Tabellini model   
Tabellini (2008) builds a very interesting model of the cultural transmission of 
cooperative values. He relies on and extends the value transmission framework first developed 
by Bisin and Verdier (2000, 2001) and Bisin et al. (2004), in which parents optimally choose 
what values to pass onto their children but, in so doing, assess their children’s welfare in terms of 
their own values. In Tabellini’s model this creates a strategic complementarity between norms 
and behavior. If more people cooperate, then the payoff from cooperation increases and this 
expands the scope of cooperation. In turn, an expansion in the scope of cooperation makes it 
easier for parents to transmit good values to their children. 
In Tabellini’s model, the effect of any institutional change (such as the quality of law 
enforcement) is amplified and protracted over time as a result of cultural transmission. Most 
importantly, when individuals are allowed to choose their institutions through voting, the 
equilibrium shows path dependence: if initial conditions are favorable, then individuals 
will transmit values of generalized cooperation and choose strong legal enforcement; if initial 
conditions are unfavorable, then individuals will opt for  values of limited cooperation and 
limited enforcement.  10 
 
 
2.2 Civic capital as trusting beliefs: the GSZ model     
To explain persistence over time, GSZ (2008) focus on the transmission of beliefs over time. 
Specifically, since trust is a key ingredient in virtually all economic transactions, they build an 
overlapping-generations model in which parents decide how much trust to transmit to their 
children  
 Economic models are generally silent on how people acquire priors (i.e., probability 
distributions over events with which they have no experience). GSZ (2008) posit that 
intergenerational cultural transmission plays a major role in the formation of such priors. To 
analyze the possible distortions in this process, they build an overlapping-generations model 
where children absorb the prior from their parents and then, after experiencing the real world, 
transmit it (updated) to their own children. The reason why this overlapping-generations model is 
not identical to an infinitely living agent is that parents do not weigh future and current benefits 
exactly the same way as children do.  
This intergenerationally transmitted prior affects each individual decision regarding 
whether to trust other members of the society and participate in an anonymous exchange. If the 
trust is well founded then an individual reaps substantial gains from trade. But if it is not, she 
will face a major loss. As a result, a pessimistic prior will induce individuals to withdraw from 
the market and not invest. This strategy does minimize losses, but it will prevent any update on 
the trustworthiness of the rest of society.    
To protect children from costly mistakes, parents transmit conservative priors to them. 
From a social point of view, these priors are excessively conservative because parents do not 
fully incorporate the value of their children learning from experience. In this context GSZ (2008) 
show that, if the net benefits of cooperation are not sufficiently high, then a society starting with 
diffuse priors will be trapped in an equilibrium of mistrust. Interestingly, starting from this 
situation, a positive large shock to the benefit of cooperation can permanently shift the 
equilibrium to a cooperative one even when the shock is temporary.  11 
 
This result could rationalize Putnam’s (1993) conjecture that the differences in civic 
capital between the North and the South of Italy could be due to the free city-state experience 
that ended more than five centuries ago. Furthermore, it can rationalize the long-lasting effect of 
a history of good institutions even after these institutions have vanished. In the context of GSZ 
(2008) model, better legal enforcement can be captured as a reduction in the cost of being 
cheated. Even a temporary reduction in this cost can permanently increase the level of 
cooperation as the good experience is transmitted across generations. This effect can also explain 
the long-lasting effect of bad colonial institutions (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2b001) or 
of legal origin (La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez de Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny 
1998). 
One limitation of GSZ model is that it assumes that trustworthiness is exogenously given 
and is not affected by the prevailing level of trust. In reality, there could be two channels through 
which beliefs can affect trustworthiness. First, a receiver who knows that the sender expects him 
to cheat is more likely to cheat, as shown by Reuben et al. (2009). Thus, mistrust breeds mistrust. 
Second, social pressure will make it easier to teach children to be trustworthy (a value) when the 
expectation (a belief) is that most people will be trustworthy.  Both these effects would 
strengthen the results of the model and the persistence of the equilibrium. These effects also 
show the complementarity between the GSZ model and Tabellini’s (2008) model. Tabellini 
addresses the transmission of values, while GSZ address the transmission of beliefs. Social 
capital is formed by both.  
Note that the beliefs accumulated in this way are perfectly rational, in the common use of 
the word rational, which requires beliefs are Bayesian. In fact, the Bayesian paradigm does not 
deal with the process of belief formation and does not address the question of the rationality of 
beliefs (Gilboa, Postlewaite, and Schmeidler, 2004). Hence, this approach allows us to integrate 
our definition of civic capital, which includes beliefs, into standard economic models.   
2.3 Civic capital as civic education: the Aghion et al. (2008) model     
Aghion et al. (2008) document a very strong correlation between mistrust and the level of 
regulation. Their explanation for this phenomenon is that there is a substitution between civic 
capital and regulation. In countries with high level of civic capital, the externalities associated 12 
 
with production are reduced because people raised with civic values are less likely to pollute and 
create externalities. More civic people are also those who trust others more. When people are not 
civic, then the only way to restrict the externalities is through regulation, hence the correlation 
between mistrust and regulation. In Aghion et al’s model, civic capital is a set of virtues that you 
learn in school.  
  While authors do not develop the process for the accumulation of civic capital, this aspect 
can be easily inserted in their model. The economic payoff of a higher level of civic capital in 
their model is very high, since a higher level of civic capital leads to a reduction of production 
externalities with lower costs of regulation. However, this payoff occurs to everybody, regardless 
of the amount of effort they spent in transmitting certain values and beliefs to their children. 
Hence, the need for some form of public financing for education, an aspect present in all 
countries.        
 
2.4 The accumulation of civic capital through socialization   
  Another important form of accumulation of civic capital is socialization. Immigrants in 
the United States, for example, slowly converge toward the U.S. mean of values and beliefs. In 
part, this can be the result of exposure to the U.S. type (and/or quantity) of education. In part, it 
can be the result of socialization with U.S. values and beliefs. Ichino and Maggi (2000), for 
example, show that Southern Italian workers who move to the North exhibit a work ethic more 
similar to the Northern ones, while Northern workers who move to the South quickly converge to 
the lower work ethic standards present in the South. Similarly, GSZ (2004) show that the use and 
availability of financial instruments is partly responsive to the level of social capital prevailing in 
the province where a person was born, but partly to the level of social capital prevailing in the 
province where a person lived. This finding suggests that people do adapt their norms and beliefs 
in response to the social pressure of the community they live in.  
  The pressure of socialization in the formation (and deterioration) of civic capital is very 
different, which can explain the asymmetry in the speed of adaptation of Southern workers 
moving to the North and Northern workers moving to the South found by Ichino and Maggi 
(2000). In the case of beliefs, a trusting person will quickly find out at his own expenses that the 13 
 
environment does not deserve the level of trust he has. By contrast, it will take longer for a 
mistrusting individual to realize he is missing out on trading opportunities by not trusting (see 
GSZ, 2008).   
   In the case of values, the process is more complicated. If civic values are completely 
embedded in preferences, they should not be modified by socialization. If, however, civic values 
are supported, at least in part, by the desire to conform to others, then socialization can lead to 
changes. Exactly how and how fast these values can improve and deteriorate as a result of social 
pressure is a topic for future research.   
 
2.5 The Effects of Religion 
Another potential source of accumulation of social capital is religion. Religion is both a source of 
moral values and an engine of socialization. As GSZ (2003) show, people who have been raised 
religiously tend to trust other more and to have stronger moral values, independent of the religion 
they have been raised into. Similarly, actively religious people trust more and have stronger 
moral values than non active ones.  
Religions might differ in the extent they are able to build trust and help accumulate civic 
capital. As Putnam (1993) claims, less hierarchical religions might foster horizontal ties among 
its followers and promote civic capital more. For example, most protestant religions delegate 
decision rights to the local parish level, teaching people to take responsibility and internalize the 
common good of their small community. By contrast, the Catholic religion does not share these 
features.  
One aspect of religion that can undermine the development of civic capital is the 
intolerance it spreads around its followers. As GSZ (2003) show, religious people are more 
intolerant of diversity than non religious ones, regardless of the type of religion, albeit some 
religions are worse than others. This intolerance may represent an obstacle to the development of 
trust and common shared values in countries with different ethnicities.    
2.6 Depreciation of civic capital      14 
 
  Physical capital mostly depreciates with use. Human capital does not depreciate with use 
(in fact it can appreciate with use), but it can depreciate with age, both for the obsolescence of 
the knowledge accumulated and for the obsolescence of the brain that acquired it. While there is 
not much literature on the depreciation of civic capital, we can certainly say that civic capital 
does not depreciate with use, in fact, like human capital, it tends to increase with use.  Reduction 
in the stock of civic capital is likely to take place in three ways.  
One way is the change in the economic or social factors that foster the formation and 
transmission of civic capital. For example, a great influx of immigrants of a different ethnicity 
can lead to an increase in racial differences that tend to undermine civic capital (Alesina and La 
Ferrara (1999)). Similarly, an increase in income inequality can have the same effect. In the same 
way, a dramatic reduction in the benefits from cooperation can have a similar effect.  
The stock of civic capital can also be reduced by some major historical event that 
generates an enduring level of mistrust.  Nunn and Wantchekon (2009), for instance, show that 
slave trade left a legacy of mistrust in the populations whose leader sold some of their people to 
slave traders. Similarly, the high level of distrust present in some countries (like Argentina and 
Brazil) could be the result of dictatorships that favor citizens spying on their fellow citizens.  
Finally, civic capital can be depreciated by some salient episodes that change people’s 
beliefs and/or change the perception of the moral acceptability of certain behaviors. While we 
are not aware of any systematic evidence in this sense, the generalized mistrust that ensued 
following the Madoff scandal is suggestive in this direction (Tatro, 2009).  
 2.7 “La Mala Educacion” 
  An important aspect, which has not been analyzed very much but should be, is whether 
different styles of education have different returns in terms of civic capital. For instance, Frank et 
al. (1993) show experimental evidence indicating not only that economic students tend to exhibit 
a more selfish behavior, but also that economic training tends to make students behave more 
selfishly both in the lab and in the field. This is hardly surprising. While economics is only a 
positive theory of human behavior, it is often presented with a normative flavor to it. Not 
contributing in a public good game is the “rational” strategy, while cooperating is deemed the 15 
 
wrong (often labeled “irrational” or “stupid’) strategy. It is hard not to see a normative aspect in 
this teaching.          
  More generally, the style of education, emphasizing joint projects, civic value, and 
cooperation, can foster the creation of civic capital in the formative years. By contrast, a more 
competitive, individualistic, and not socially oriented teaching style can reduce the effect of 
education on civic capital.   
 
2.8 Values and beliefs as long lasting civic capital      
All these examples show that our definition of civic capital as the set of values and 
beliefs that foster cooperative behavior fulfils Solow’s requirements.  This capital can be 
accumulated in an investment process that is similar to, but distinct from, the investment of 
physical or human capital. When parents put (costly) effort in transmitting certain values and 
priors to their offspring, they invest in civic capital. When the formal education process tries to 
instill certain values and beliefs in the younger generations, it spends (mostly public) resources 
to accumulate civic capital. When individuals ostracize and reprimand behaviors they deem to be 
antisocial, they spend time and effort to teach certain values and beliefs to their fellow citizens, 
because they are well aware that only a few free riders can destroy a cooperative equilibrium and 
thus they intervene to preserve the benefit of cooperation. This accumulation process is 
consistent with methodological individualism (the paradigm of economics) and thus easily 
incorporated in standard economic models, but is different from human capital because it has a 
social dimension to it: civic values and beliefs have a return only if shared by other members of 
the community.  
Even more than physical and human capital, civic capital takes time to accumulate and 
has increasing returns to scale. It takes time to accumulate because two of the three ways in 
which it is accumulated (intergenerational transmission and formal education) requires the 
passage of a generation to have an effect. It has increasing returns to scale because the payoff 
from an individual investment in civic capital positively depends upon the prevailing level of 
civic capital in a community. The combination of these two factors makes civic capital a leading 
potential explanation for persistence in the level of development observed around the world. We 16 
 
are going to return to this in Section 5, after having discussed how civic capital can be measured 
and how it has accumulated over time.    
 
3. Measuring civic capital 
Traditionally, the measurement of social capital has been a very contentious issue. Precisely 
because the concept is so complex and multidimensional, we can find many different measures 
in the literature, which capture the many dimensions of these various definitions. One good 
example of this complexity is a recent attempt by the World Bank to design questionnaires to 
obtain measures of civic capital to be implemented primarily in developing countries. They 
identify six families of variables, each meant to capture one dimension of social capital: “Groups 
and Networks,” “Trust and Solidarity.” “Collective Action and Cooperation,” “Information and 
Communication,” “Social Cohesion and Inclusion,” “Empowerment and Political Action” (see 
Grootaret et. al, 2005).  Of course, the ambiguity that is reflected in the various definitions is also 
evident in these measures.     
The multidimensionality of the social capital concept has induced many authors to try to 
measure it by looking at outcomes, e.g., the level of economic cooperation or the diffusion of 
newspaper readership (Putnam 1993). One problem with these measures is that they are 
contaminated by other factors. For example, is the level of trust a New Yorker exhibits in her 
daily economic behavior the result of good law enforcement or the product of a high level of 
social capital? Similarly, the diffusion of cooperative firms across different communities may 
reflect different tax incentives to set up cooperative firms or patterns of industrial specializations 
(it is difficult to run an oil company as a cooperative) rather than the strength of cultural values 
and beliefs that can sustain a high level of cooperation and exchange.  
In this section, we show that our narrower definition lends itself to easier measurements. 
We can directly measure both values and beliefs and, even if we want to resort to outcome-based 
measures, we can more easily isolate more accurate proxies.  
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3.1 Direct measures: values  
3.1.1 Survey measures of values  
Several surveys such as the World Values Surveys, the European Social Survey, the 
General Social Survey, Eurobarometer, and the German Socio Economic Panel (among others) 
collect direct measures of values and beliefs. One important advantage is that some (though not 
all) of these surveys collect data for many countries. The most recently available wave of the 
World Values Surveys conducted in 2005 includes 56 countries worldwide. Pooling the 1995-97 
and 1999-2000 waves it covers 80 countries. Because of its broad geographical coverage and its 
longer tradition, the WVS has been widely used in the social capital literature and has often acted 
as a reference for other surveys that aim to collecting information on values and beliefs. 
Not all the values measured in the WVS are relevant for our definition of civic capital, 
rather only those that induce individuals to cooperate. One way to identify the relevant questions 
is to focus on those values that induce people to dislike actions that obtain private benefits at 
high social costs. For instance, people’s opinions about cheating on taxes, free riding on public 
goods, cutting in line, littering and similar behaviors can all be good indicators of the prevalence 
of norms of morality and thus of people’s willingness to internalize the public good.  The 
common features across all these measure is that they are value judgments on activities that 
result in the appropriation of (possibly limited) private benefits at the expenses of (possibly much 
larger) costs imposed on other members of society.  
To illustrate how some of these norms can provide a measure of civic capital, we use the 
responses individuals gave n the WVS when asked: “Please tell me for each of the following 
statements whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in 
between, using this card.’’ Answers range from 1–10, where 1=never justifiable and10=always 
justifiable. We chose to focus on seven questions that capture how much people value the public 
good. These questions are: ‘‘Claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled’’ (var 
1); ‘‘Avoiding a fare on public transport’’ (var 2); ‘‘Cheating on taxes if you have a chance’’ 
(var 3); ‘‘‘Accepting a bribe in the course of their duties’’ (var 4); “Lying in your own interest” 
(var 5);  “Throwing away litter in a public space” (var 6); “Speeding over the limit in built up 
areas” (var 7).   18 
 
To make these variables reflect increases in civic capital, we recoded them so that 10 
means “never justifiable” and 1 “always justifiable.”  The sample means for these variables are 
summarized in Table 1, Panel A, which also shows the number of countries for which these 
variables are available.
4 As the mean values show, there is a general dislike for opportunistic 
behaviors, but there is ample variation in the intensity of the values. Interestingly, as Panel B 
shows, all these values are positively correlated consistent with answers reflecting a general 
norm of “good behavior;” but the correlation is far from perfect, suggesting that each one has 
some independent information. To summarize these values in a single index of civic capital, we 
have extracted the first principal component using the three variables (1, 2 and 4) that are 
available for most countries. All individual measures are also highly correlated with the principal 
component (Table 1, panel B). Table 2 reports the country means of variables 1, 2 and 4 as well 
as the principal component for all countries for which they are simultaneously available and 
Figure 1, panel A plots the values across countries of the principal component. There is wide 
variation with a tendency for more economically developed countries to have higher civic values.  
One issue with these specific measures is that people may have poor incentives to reveal 
their true values: after all, why one should not please the interviewer by saying that he considers 
as never justifiable littering in public spaces even if he is one that actually throws away litter? 
This could explain the average high values of the indexes in Table 2. Furthermore, it is plausible 
that those who lie to the interviewer are precisely the ones with lower civic values, as telling the 
truth at own cost is a dimension of civicness—a tendency that would bias the index towards low 
geographical variability. 
One way to verify that these measures are not biased is to compare them with other 
measures of values that are presumably less subject to this problem. For instance, Tabellini 
(2009) constructs measures of cultural capital using the answers to three WVS questions aimed 
at capturing cultural traits that ought to encourage welfare enhancing social interactions: respect, 
obedience, and control. The variable respect is defined as being equal to 1 if the respondent 
indicates the quality “tolerance and respect for other people” as being one of the top five 
qualities children are encouraged to learn at home. A high share of people that value respect is 
                                                 
4 While variables 1, 2 and 4 are available for at least 79 of the 81 countries covered by the two rounds, the other 
variables have a lower geographical coverage. 19 
 
taken as a sign of a stronger culture of extended morality. Obedience is the fraction of people 
that regards obedience as an important quality that children should be encouraged to learn. 
According to Tabellini (2009), higher values of this index indicate lower cultural capital, since a 
coercive cultural environment stifles individual initiative and cooperation within a group. 
Finally, control is the answer to the question “Some people feel they have completely free choice 
and control over their lives, while other people feel that what we do has no real effect on what 
happens to them.”  The idea is that in hierarchical societies, where people can only count on their 
family members and the rest of society is perceived as inimical, success is perceived more as the 
result of luck than of personal effort.  
Table 2, Panel A reports summary statistics for these three indicators and Figure 1, Panel 
B shows the variation across countries of their first principal component, which again shows a lot 
of diversity and a clear correlation with the level of a country’s economic development.
5 These 
measures are less subject to reporting bias. Interestingly, both the principal component based on 
the civicness values and on Tabellini’s values are highly positively correlated.        
 
3.1.2 Experimental measures of values  
 The values that are at the base of civic capital can also be measured through controlled 
experiments, either in the lab or in the field. Camerer and Fehr (2003) provide a very useful 
overview of the methodologies for measuring social norms in a variety of games that involve 
cooperation.  
A typical game that can be informative about peoples’ adherence to norms of civic 
behavior is the public good game. People in a group of N (the number of participants in the 
experiment) are each given a sum S; each participant can contribute this endowment to a 
common fund managed by an administrator. If the administrator receives more than a given (and 
known) threshold 01 λ << of the overall endowmentsNS × , for instance 80%, than everyone 
receives back more than S—e.g.  twice as much, a measure of the return to cooperation—
otherwise they receive nothing.  Individually, each participant has an incentive to free ride, keep 
                                                 
5 Tabellini (2009) also uses trust as a measure of civic cultural traits and in constructing his principal component.   
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S and hope the others will all contribute to the fund, reaping the benefits of the public good. If 
more than  N λ  participants free ride, however, no public good can be produced and all lose. 
Hence, shared norms of extended morality and civicness can temper individual incentives and 
lead the majority to cooperate by contributing their endowment. The stronger these norms are, 
the larger λ  is, and the higher the civic capital in the group is, making it easier to produce the 
public good. Thus λ   can be seen as a continuous measure of the civic norms of a community. If 
the game is played in different communities, differences in λ can be used to study the effect of 
civic capital on outcomes, as done by Carpenter and Seki (2005), Karlan (2005), and Fehr and 
Leibbrandt (2008).  
Compared to survey-based measures of norms, such as those illustrated above, measures 
of civic capital obtained from experimental games have several advantages. First, the game 
imposes some structure which facilitates interpretation of the behaviors observed or the answers 
obtained. This is not often the case when individuals are asked qualitative questions of the sort 
illustrated above as it is common in many surveys. Obviously, better designed survey questions 
can reduce the relevance of this problem. For instance, a question such as: “If 90% of the 
members of your community contribute $10 to a city hall project each, including you, could reap 
a benefit that is worth $50 (for instance you and your family have access to a new park). But if 
less than 90% contribute, then the project fails. Would you contribute your 10 dollars?” comes 
close to replicating the public good game and can thus be more easily interpreted than qualitative 
questions on free riding.  
A second advantage of experimental games measures is that answers can be made 
incentive compatible by having participants playing with true money and providing them with 
appropriate monetary incentives, while paying subjects in survey is both unpractical and 
expensive. Unpractical because it is difficult to manage a large number of small payments. 
Expensive because even small payments can turn into large sum when the number of respondents 
run into the tens of thousands.  
On the flip side, experiments have limitations that surveys do not have. Perhaps the most 
important one is the difficulty to run experiments on representative samples or even on samples 
other than undergraduates at major universities. If one is concerned in obtaining a measure of the 21 
 
predominant cultural values of a large society, issues of representiveness may be of first order 
importance.        
The validity of using laboratory experiments to measure social preferences has been 
questioned by Levitt and List (2007). In their view, several factors distort the behavior of 
subjects in the lab. In particular, Levitt and List (2007) claim that lab experiments are biased by 
the so-called “experimenter effect.” Subjects in the lab sometimes may try to please the 
experimenter, responding to subtle social cues that the investigator provides in the instructions 
and administration of the game (Rosenthal, 1976; Hoffman et al., 1994). This critique is 
particularly strong when applied to measures of social preferences as the subjects may be 
induced to “look good” in the eyes of the experimenter by exhibiting pro-social behavior, even if 
they would behave as self-interested individuals outside the laboratory.  
However, Baran et al. (2009) find a strong correlation between the reciprocity measure in 
a trust experiment and reciprocity manifested through a “give back” donation campaign in an 
MBA program. Most importantly, they show that the behavior in the field is correlated with the 
social desirability scale, a questionnaire-based index that measures how much a person tries to 
please others, while behavior in the lab is not. This evidence suggests that the experimenter 
effect if exists is not so pronounced in standard economic games.  
 
3.2 Direct measures: beliefs  
Willingness to cooperate and act together with others depends critically on one’s beliefs about 
the opponent’s behavior. In particular, beliefs about the “fairness” and the “trustworthiness” of 
other people one may find herself interacting with are key ingredients in many economic (and 
non-economic) transactions. If members of a community have reasons to believe others are 
unfair, they may be reluctant to grant coordination and decision power for fear of abuse. 
Similarly diffuse mistrust beliefs can discourage people’s willingness to invest and hamper 
economic success. Thus, fairness and, even more so, trust have attracted the attentions of 
economists and social scientists interested in studying the effects of cultural capital.  Besides 
relevance, from the measurement point of view there is one important reason to pay attention to 22 
 
fairness and trust beliefs: they are much less ambiguous concepts, and because of this easier to 
measure and, as we see, to compare. 
In particular, trust can be given a very specific probabilistic content. As stated by 
Gambetta (1988), “When we say we trust someone or that someone is trustworthy, we implicitly 
mean that the probability that he will perform an action that is beneficial…is high enough for us 
to consider in engaging in some form of cooperation with him.” Gambetta (2000) definition of 
trust makes two important points: first, trust, being a belief, can be measured as a probability; 
since probabilities are cardinal, they have a very specific quantitative content. Thus, as a measure 
of civic capital one can say whether there is more or less of it in a given community by 
comparing the average probability that people trust other members of the community with the 
average in another community. Second, higher values of this probability enhance cooperation, as 
implied by civic capital.  Because of these features trust has been widely used in the literature as 
a measure of social capital. 
 
3.2.1 Measuring trust in surveys 
When measuring trusting beliefs, it is important to distinguish between personalized trust and 
generalized trust. Personalized trust is the trust that one has towards a well identified individual- 
e.g. his boss, his fund manager, or a specific class mate. Generalized trust is instead the trust that 
a given person has toward a generic and unknown (randomly drawn) member of a broader 
community, such the other Americans or people of another country (e.g. the trust the French 
have towards the British).  
Most research has focused on generalized trust, since the earlier rounds of the WVS only 
asked a question pertaining to that: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be 
trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?” with 'Most people can be 
trusted' and  'Need to be very careful' as possible answers. In this question, “people” means other 
people of the same country. These dichotomous qualitative answers are particularly useful to 
characterize the fraction of people that express trust in a community.  23 
 
Figure 2 shows how this measure varies across countries. There are three interesting 
features to notice: first, there is an enormous variability in the fraction of people that trust others; 
this ranges from as low as 3 percent in Brazil to as high as 67 percent in Denmark. Second, there 
is very strong correlation, visible at glance, between average trust and a country level of 
economic development, which has obviously attracted the attention of economists and that, 
prima facie, is consistent with civic capital having an economic payoff. Third, average 
generalized trust correlates well with the principal components of the indicators for civic capital 
(Figure 3, Panel A) and that of generalized morality (Figure 3, Panel B), which is evidence that 
all these measures capture the underlying civic capital.             
The last wave of the WVS also includes some questions about personalized trust: “I’d 
like to ask you how much you trust people from various groups,” which include a) the family; b) 
the neighbors; c) people one knows personally; d) people one meets for the first time. Answers 
are provided on a 1-4 scale ranging from no trust to complete trust and somewhat trust in 
between.   
Table 4 shows mean country values for these measures of trust. Not surprising, trust in 
family members is higher than in people one knows personally, which in turns is higher than 
trust in neighbors, and trust in strangers. Equally unsurprising, at the country level, generalized 
trust (fraction of people who respond that most people can be trusted) is most highly correlated 
with trust towards strangers, then with trust towards neighbors, trust towards somebody one 
knows, and finally with the trust toward a family member. More interestingly, there is relatively 
little cross country variation in the trust in family (st. dev of 0.1 with a mean of 3.8), while trust 
in strangers has more variability (st. dev of 0.26, with a mean of 2.0).   
If we want to measure a country’s or a community’s civic capital, which is the right 
measure of trust? From a theoretical point of view, the right measure is generalized trust. For 
institutions and markets to work properly, people need to trust strangers. High levels of personal 
trust not joined by high levels of generalized trust are generally the result of strong in group ties 
(e.g., Greif, 1993).  Hence, high trust towards people one is close to—such as the family 
members or people that one knows personally—relative to trust towards people one meets for the 
first time can be taken as a weak norms index of generalized morality (Banfield, 1958; Alesina 
and Giuliano, 2008).   24 
 
One possible limitation of the WVS question is that people can only say whether they 
trust or not, but cannot express the intensity of the belief. Some surveys allow for a richer 
spectrum of answers: for instance, the recently constructed US trust index (Sapienza and 
Zingales, 2009) is based on the WVS questions but allows people to answer on a scale between 1 
( “I do not trust them at all”) and 5 (“ I trust them completely”). The European Social Survey 
allows for an even finer partition with answers to the WVS questions on a scale between 0 (no 
trust at all) and 10 (complete trust). Intensity of beliefs can be useful to get a better 
characterization of their distribution within a population and thus provide an indication of how 
homogeneous, and thus shared, are these beliefs within a certain community. Figure 4 shows the 
distributions of trust for the 26 countries surveyed in the round II of the European Social Survey 
used by Butler et. al. (2009). Several points are worth noticing: a) in all countries people hold 
heterogeneous beliefs with some people trusting a lot and some not trusting at all; b) the shape of 
the distributions differ markedly across countries not only their means; c) the degree of 
heterogeneity also differs across countries with distributions more concentrated in the 
Scandinavian countries which have also a high level of average trust.      
        One large scale survey—Eurobarometer—has collected information on trust since the rise 
of the European Union with a very interesting twist. In order to monitor the sentiments of the 
Europeans as the process of integration and enlargement of the E.U. evolved,  Eurobarometer has 
asked respondents of different nationalities to report not only how much they trust their fellow 
citizens but also how much they trust the citizens of each of the countries in the European Union. 
More specifically, they were asked the following: "I would like to ask you a question about how 
much trust you have in people from various countries. For each, please tell me whether you have 
a lot of trust, some trust, not very much trust or no trust at all." The set of countries sampled 
varies over time with the enlargement of the European Union: there were 5 in 1970 (France, 
Belgium, The Netherlands, Germany and Italy), when the first survey was conducted, and has 
grown to 17 in 1995, the last survey to which we have access.
6       
                                                 
6 In some of the surveys, this same question was also asked with reference to citizens of a number of non-European 
Union countries, including the United States, Russia, Switzerland, China, Japan, Turkey, and some Eastern and 
Central European countries which at the time were perspective entrants into the Union (Bulgaria, Slovakia, 
Romania, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, and Czech Republic). See Guiso Sapienza and Zingales (2009) and the online 
appendix to the paper for details. 25 
 
Following Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2009) who first used these data, we have re-
coded the answers to the trust question setting them to 1 (no trust at all), 2 (not very much trust), 
3 (some trust), and 4 (a lot of trust) and have then aggregated responses by country and year 
computing the mean value of the responses to each survey. Table 3 shows the average level of 
trust that citizens from each country have toward citizens of other countries. There is 
considerable variation in the level of trust exhibited from one country to another. The average 
level of trust ranges from a minimum trust of 2.13 (the trust of Portuguese toward Austrians) to a 
maximum of 3.69 (the trust of Finns toward Finns). Besides this variability, Table 3 shows three 
regularities. First, there are systematic differences in how much a given country trusts and how 
much it is trusted by others (see the last row and last column of Table 3). For instance, the 
Portuguese and the Greeks are those who trust the least and the Swedish those who trust the 
most. Second, there is tendency of people from one country to trust more their fellow citizens. 
Third, there is a correlation between trusting and being trusted. Nordic countries are at the top of 
the level of trustworthiness and tend to trust others the most. While not definitive proof, this fact 
suggests that people excessively apply the level of trustworthiness of their own countrymen to 
people from other countries. This result is also consistent with experimental evidence in Glaeser 
et al. (2000) and Sapienza, Toldra, and Zingales (2008).  
While these data provide a measure of specific trust, not generalized, they have been used 
to shed light on the cultural determinants of trust (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2009). With 
regard to civic capital formation, one interesting issue that can be studied with these  data  is 
whether political inclusion can affect the beliefs people have about the trustworthiness of other 
populations that before were not part of the same political entity.  
As in every survey, there may be some doubts about the way people interpret the trust 
question. In a trust game (see below), the level of trust maps into the amount of money one is 
willing to risk. Here, this mapping is missing. One can address this doubt by asking the trust 
question so as to eliminate the ambiguity that may be present in the wording of the WVS-trust 
question. For instance in one of the modules of the 2003 Dutch National Bank Household survey 
(DNB survey), a sample of 1,990 individuals were asked both the WVS question and the 
following one: "Suppose that a random person you do not know personally receives by mistake a 
sum of 1000 euros that belong to you. He or she is aware that the money belongs to you and 26 
 
knows your name and address. He or she can keep the money without incurring in any 
punishment. According to you what is the probability (a number between zero and 100) that he 
or she returns the money?"  This question maps trust into a probability that a generic person 
behaves honestly, allowing for a clear interpretation and a natural metric for measuring trust 
beliefs. Answers to this question are positively correlated with the WVS question, suggesting 
that the latter indeed captures beliefs about the trustworthiness of fellow citizens.   
In recent surveys it is becoming more standard to ask trust questions in such a way that 
they better reflect people’s assessment about the probability of being cheated by an anonymous 
opponent. For instance the 2005 Mexican Family Life Survey—a newly designed multi-thematic 
survey that interviews over 40,000 Mexican citizens—asks the following probabilistic question: 
“If you lost your wallet with $200 pesos in it, how probable is it that you will get it back with all 
of your money and everything else inside it if someone who lives close to you found it?” with 
answers between 0 (will not get it back for sure) and 100 (get it back for sure). Probabilistic trust 
questions have the advantage of increasing comparability of the answers both across people and 
social groups and, since their elicitation requires reference to an explicit event (such as returning 
a lost wallet), avoids the “vagueness” that may characterize questions like the ones asked in the 
WVS.    
A second doubt about the WVS question is that it may reflect people’s ability to detect 
others’ trustworthiness. The 2003 DNB also asks respondents "How good are you (very good, 
good, not very good, not good at all) in detecting people who are trustworthy?" Answers to this 
question are not correlated with those to the trust question, suggesting the latter does not reflect 
differences in ability to detect trustworthiness, but rather the subjective probability that a random 
person is trustworthy.
7 
                                                 
7  Another criticism to the WVS trust question is that the respondents have the choice between trusting and being 
cautious rather than between trust and distrust. Hence, it may be mixing two different phenomena, trust and 
cautiousness (see Yamagishi et al., 1999), which may be not be mutually exclusive.  One implication is that the 
interpretation of the WVS trust question may differ among societies if cautiousness does even if they trust equally 
(Miller and Mitamura, 2003). The simplest way to deal with this issues is to change the wording of the question and 
ask, for example,  “How much do you trust other people in your country?” providing an appropriate scale, as done 
fro instance by Naef and Shupp (2009) using the Gernman Socio-Economic Panel.        
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Perhaps, a more serious objection raised against questions of the sort asked in the WVS is 
that they may be poor measures of trust beliefs and rather reflect some combination of beliefs 
about others trustworthiness (what we would like to be picking up) and individual preferences—
a point forcefully made by Fehr (2009). Actual trust behavior, as measured for instance by the 
amount of money that a person would be willing to lend to an unknown individual, obviously 
depends both on the belief the lender has about the borrower’s trustworthiness as well as on the 
lender’s willingness to bear the risk that the borrower does not repay. When faced with “social 
risk” – that is the risk that a loss is caused by another person rather than nature -  what matters is 
betrayal aversion (Bohnet and Zeckhauser, 2004) – that is the dislike for the risk of being 
cheated, not risk aversion. By using the German Socio-Economic Panel (which collects measures 
of trust, risk preferences and betrayal aversion), Fehr (2009) finds that the people who are more 
risk averse and more betrayal averse also trust less, where trust is measured as in the WVS.  This 
finding is consistent with answers to these questions reflecting also individual preferences, 
perhaps because when asked people mentally simulate the act of trusting rather that isolating 
their belief about others’ trustworthiness. If risk aversion and betrayal aversion were 
heterogeneous across individuals, but not across cultures, then one could still use variation in 
average generalized trust measures of the WVS type for cross countries comparisons. However, 
evidence from 6 countries (Brazil, China, Oman, Switzerland, Turkey and the United States) 
collected by Bonnet et al (2008) seems to suggest that risk and betrayal preferences do differ, 
though sample sizes are not large enough to draw strong conclusions (see also Naef et al. 2008). 
These findings suggest that when designing survey questions to measure trust beliefs, wording 
should be such that it is clear to the respondent what one is concerned about: his beliefs about 
others’ trustworthiness. In this regard, probability questions of type asked in the Mexican survey 
could be a step ahead.   
    
3.2.2 Measuring trust in trust experiments  
As with preferences one can use lab or field experiments to measure trust. Since it was first 
proposed by Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995), the trust game has become a routine tool to 
obtain measures of trust. In a trust game an individual, the sender, is endowed with a sum of 
money E. He is paired with another player (typically anonymous), the receiver. The sender has to 28 
 
choose how much of his endowment he wants to send to the receiver. If he sends 0 SE ≤≤ the 
sum gets multiplied by a factor  1 λ >  (typically 2 or 3) before reaching the receiver; this is meant 
to capture the creation of surplus from trusting and investing. The receiver then decides, without 
the sender observing his action, how much of the sum he gets,  S λ , he wants to return to the 
sender. The fraction of the endowment sent—S/E—is bounded between 0 and 1 and provides a 
behavioral measure of trust that has a clear interpretation. The trust game also allows researchers 
to obtain a measure of trustworthiness, by taking the fraction of  S λ  that is returned to the 
sender.  
The main advantage of the trust game is that one can obtain a more easily interpretable 
measure of trust. Furthermore, since one can ask the sender also to report his expectations about 
the amount she thinks the receiver will return, the trust game allows researchers to neatly 
separate beliefs and preferences (the latter being embedded in the behavioral trust). This has 
helped clarify the meaning of the WVS questions and provide some external validity to it. 
Glaeser et al. (2000), for instance, argue that the World Values Survey trust question is not 
correlated with the sender behavior in the standard trust game but reflects instead correlated 
behavioral trustworthiness in the game. However, Sapienza, Toldra, and Zingales (2008) argue 
that the sender behavior in the trust game is not a good measure of trust beliefs, because, being a 
behavioral measure, it is also affected by other regarding preferences. Using the sender's 
expectation about the receiver's behavior, Sapienza, Toldra, and Zingales (2008) show that this 
expectation strongly correlates with the World Values Survey trust question and other similar 
trust questions.
8  To better understand what survey and trust game measures actually mean, Naef 
and Shupp (2009) have a randomly selected group of the German Socio-Economic Panel play a 
standard trust game. They find that trust in the experiment is best correlated with the survey 
measure of trust when people are asked how much they trust strangers. This is useful, as it is 
precisely trust in anonymous members of a community that civic capital is about.   
3.2.3 Other beliefs  
Though a large literature has focused on trust, other beliefs, such as fairness or expectations 
about others corruption, are likely to be as important in encouraging extended social interactions 
                                                 
8 There is very large literature that uses the trust game to measure trust behaviour and, less often, trust beliefs. A 
good account of this literature is provided by Fehr (2009) and Naef and Shupp (2009).       29 
 
and willingness to cooperate with others. Several surveys now ask questions about expected 
fairness and other potentially important beliefs. For instance, the last round of the WVS obtains a 
qualitative measure of expected fairness by asking: “Do you think most people would try to take 
advantage of you if they got a chance, or would they try to be fair? Please show your response on 
this card, where 1 means that “people would try to take advantage of you” and 10 means that 
“people would try to be fair.”
9  Fairness beliefs are positively correlated with trust, but 
correlation is far from perfect (on the 2005 WVS correlation with country averages of 
generalized trust is 0.6 and with trust towards people met for the first time is 0.43). 
Summing up, this discussion has shown that once social capital is redefined as civic 
capital, that is as the set of beliefs and preferences that are shared by a community and that 
facilitate community members’ achievement of common interest goals, it can be measured. We 
can obtain measures for the diffusion of norms of civicness and generalized morality as well as 
measures of trust beliefs and fairness that help characterize the stock of civic capital in a 
community, which is required by Solow in his criticism of social capital. Needless to say, these 
measures are far from being free of problems; there are issues of interpretation, comparison 
across countries, selection of which indicators to use etc. But these issues are probably no more 
severe that the ones that one we face when building a measure of aggregate physical capital, as 
shown by the capital controversy debate of the 1960s to which Solow himself contributed with 
the same constructive criticism that he has provided to the social capital debate.   
3.3 Indirect measures   
As we discussed earlier, outcome-based measures of civic capital are difficult to interpret, 
because they are contaminated by the effects of other institutions. When we observe that Swedes 
evade taxes less than Brazilians, we do not know to what extent this is the effect of Sweden’s 
higher social capital or superior tax enforcement. For an outcome-based measure to qualify as a 
good indicator of civic capital, the relationship between the input (civic capital) and the 
measured output should be stable and unaffected by other factors, such as legal enforcement. 
These conditions are not generally present. There are, however, particular situations where they 
are likely to be met.  
                                                 
9 The fairness questions started to be asked in the WVS 2000 wave but answers were dichotomous; other surveys, 
notably the ESS and the GSS, ask also beliefs about fairness.    30 
 
One such instance is donation of blood or organs. Since there is no economic payoff to 
either donation and there is no legal obligation to donate, the decision to donate can be seen as a 
direct measure of how much people internalize the common good. Donating organs and/or blood 
provides insurance to others, with no direct compensation for the person providing it. Therefore, 
it is the ultimate example of valuing the common good. For these reasons, GSZ (2004) and GSZ 
(2009) use them as measures of civic capital.  
Another example is voter turnout. Since there is no direct economic payoff to voting, this 
measure captures the extent to which people in a community are willing to pay a personal cost to 
enhance the common good. For this reason, Putnam (1993) uses electoral participation in 
referenda as a measure of the underlying civicness. 
Consistent with the idea that these measures are capturing the same underlying norms, 
they tend to be highly correlated. Figures 5 and 6 plot the distribution of participation in 
referenda and blood donation across the 95 Italian provinces.  As Figure 5 shows voter turnout is 
higher in the north of Italy (north of the Apennines), weaker in the center (from the Apennines to 
Rome), and very weak in the south (south of Rome). It is indeed this difference within Italy that 
attracted the attention of Banfield (1958) first and Putnam (1993) subsequently. Figure 6 shows 
the geographical distribution of the indirect measure based on blood donation.   The geographical 
pattern that we see in Figure 6 is very similar to the one shown in Figure 5 using a totally 
different indicator. Despite the different nature of these variables, their cross-correlation is as 
high (0.64), as one would expect if indeed they are the reflection of the same set of cultural 
norms of civic behavior. Notice however that the correlation is far from perfect, suggesting that 
indirect indicators are affected by measurement error. Hence, if one were to rely on measures of 
this sort in applied work one could gain some insights by obtaining several indirect indicators 
and looking at common components (see Tabellini (2009)).  
 Another example of a legitimate outcome-based measure of civic capital is Fisman and 
Miguel (2010) paper on parking violations by United Nations officials in Manhattan. Until 2002, 
diplomatic immunity protected U.N. diplomats from parking enforcement actions. Only cultural 
norms prevent U.N. diplomats from parking illegally. Hence, the number of parking violations 
per diplomat is a good measure of the strength of the social norms in each country. As Fisman 31 
 
and Miguel (2010) show, this measure is correlated with other, less clean, outcome-based 
measures such as corruption.  
3.4 Are these measures useful? 
Economists are interested in civic capital because they think might help explain differences in 
economic development. Thus, a necessary, albeit not sufficient condition, for these measures to 
be of interest is that they are correlated with indicator of economic and institutional performance. 
To check whether this is the case, Table 4 looks at the correlation between these measures and 
several economic and institutional indicators.  
  To begin with we look at the correlation between income per capita in 2007 and three sets 
of measures of civic capital: a measure of expectations (trust in stranger), a survey-based 
measure of norms (the principal component of the answers to three World Value Survey 
questions on values), and an outcome-based measure (the number of parking violations per UN 
diplomat). As Table 4.a shows, both trust and parking violations have a statistical significant 
correlation with productivity, no matter whether we measure productivity per capita or per 
worker. By contrast, the principal component of norms does not appear to be correlated. If we 
substitute trust in strangers with the general trust question, the effect is similar, but weaker. 
  As Figure 7 shows, this effect of trust appears to be limited to the more developed 
countries. While there is a very strong correlation between trust and economic development for 
countries with a per capital GDP above $20,000, there is no correlation below that level. One 
possible explanation is that trust is particularly useful in more sophisticated transactions. For 
example, one can effectively run a sugar plantation without much trust, while it is difficult to 
engage in financial transactions without it. Consistent with this hypothesis, GSZ (2009) find that 
mutual trust between countries is more important in international trading of more differentiated 
goods.       
  In Table 4.b we correlated various institutional measures with the same right hand side 
variables. To distinguish between the direct effect of civic capital and its indirect effect via a 
generalized increase in income per capita, for each left hand side variable we report two 
regressions, one controlling for income per capita, the other not.  32 
 
  The main result is that trust seems to be positively correlated with all the measures of 
institutional development, from bureaucratic delays to corruption, from tax evasion to an index 
of government anti-diversion policies. This correlation is statistically different from zero, 
regardless of whether we control for per capita income. By contrast, the measure of parking 
violations is negatively correlated with the measure of institutional development, but this 
correlation becomes statistically insignificant when we control for per capita income. Finally, the 
survey-based measure of norms is not correlated with any measure of institutional development.    
          In sum, if we are interested in studying the effect of civic capital on economic outcomes, 
the survey-based measure of trust seems to be the most promising indicator. By contrast, a 
survey-based measure of norms does not seem to add any value. One plausible explanation is 
that people are more inclined to distort their answers to questions regarding moral values, 
because they are sensitive to the judgment of the interviewer. The advantage of the trust question 
instead is that it does not have any obvious answer that is more socially acceptable.  
  
  4. The Origins of Civic Capital  
 
In Figure 1 and 2 we show the enormous variability in values and beliefs across countries. This 
raises the question of where these differences in civic capital come from.  This is a very difficult 
question since it is the same as asking what factors may trigger the adoption and diffusion among 
the members of a community of cultural norms of generalized morality and cooperation. In this 
section we start by showing some cross country evidence on the main correlates of civic capital. 
As in all cross country regressions, it is impossible to make any causal statement. To try to 
address the causality, we will resort to review some within country studies that shed more light 
on this dimension.  
4.1 Correlates of Civic Capital   
We will start by analyzing the one dimension of civic capital that appears more correlated 
with economic performance: trust in strangers. For this variable we rely on the World Value 
Survey measure, hence our sample is constrained by the WVS country coverage. To account for 33 
 
possible feedback effects between economic performance and civic capital, in studying the 
correlates of civic capital we will control for log of GDP per capita (measured in 1997).   
As described in Section 2, one of the potential sources of accumulation of civic capital is 
education. To capture the level of education accumulated over time, we measure the primary 
enrollment in the 1920a as computed by Benavot and Riddle (1988). As Table 6 shows, this is 
positively and significantly correlated with of measure of civic capital: today’s level of trust in 
strangers. One standard deviation increase in 1920 enrollment is associated with a 70% of a 
standard deviation increase in trust in strangers.     
In column 2 we add the level of ethnic fractionalization. As Alesina and La Ferrara 
(1999) show, ethnic diversity is negatively correlated with trust. We find the same coefficient, 
but it is not significant in this regression. In Column 3 we also control for the number of years a 
country has been a democracy since independence. As we argued, historical experience of 
political participation has a positive effect on civic capital. As predicted, the effect is positive, 
but it is not statistically significant. Ethnic fractionalization, however, becomes significant. 
Finally, in column 4 we control for the prevalence of two hierarchical religions: Catholicism and 
Islam. The percentage of Catholic in a country is negatively correlated with trust, while the 
percentage of Muslims not. When we include these controls the effect of years of democracy 
since independence turns significant.  Together these variables account for 45% of the cross 
country variation of civic capital, supporting all the various channel of accumulation of civic 
capital reported in Section 2.  
 In Table 6.b we show the same set of regressions with the parking violation measure of 
civic capital taken from Fisman and Miguel (2010). The educational level appears to be 
negatively associated with the number of parking violation per diplomat, albeit this effect is 
significant only when we do not insert too many controls. Besides that, only the percentage of 
Muslim is positively correlated with the number of parking violations.  
Finally, In Table 6.C we show that the principal components of the civic values measured 
via survey is not correlated with any of the variables above, except for the percentage of Muslim 
in the country, which has a positive effect.  34 
 
A more elaborated analysis of the relationship between political history and civic capital 
is provided by Tabellini (2009).  He focuses on variation in norms and beliefs across regions of 
Europe. He measures civic capital with the level of the WVS trust and with the principal 
component of the measures of obedience, respect and control discussed in Section 3. Since he 
uses within country variation, he can exclude (by inserting country level fixed effects) that 
current cultural values reflect heterogeneous formal institution, as would be case, for instance, if 
legal codes offer different degrees of legal protections which in turn affect the willingness of 
individuals to trust their counterparts in a trade.  
The key idea, reminiscent of Putnam (1993) and Banfield (1958) is that autocratic and 
hierarchical regimes that perpetuate thanks to imposition and brutal force rather than consensus 
are natural vehicle of creation of a culture of mistrust. Because they subdue individuals they are 
inimical of self determination and individual autonomy, which discourages individual initiative 
and willingness to collaborate and join forces with others that do not belong to the narrow family 
circle. In such environment widespread illiteracy is seen as reinforcement of these negative 
attitudes “…because it isolates individuals and it reduces their ability to control and understand 
the external environment”.   
Consistent with distant political history playing a role, Tabellini (2009) finds that historically 
more backward regions – that is regions with higher illiteracy rates more than 200 years ago and 
with a long history of relatively poor political institutions - tend to have today worse cultural 
traits: they have lower generalized trust, less respect for others, less confidence in the individual 
and a lower value of the of these indicators together as measured by their first principal 
component. Thus a long history of bad political climate can result in cultural norms that are 
adverse to extended exchanges, that is in a lower value of civic capital.  
One big advantage of Tabellini (2009) study is that it shows that general political 
histories can be behind the differences in cultural norms and beliefs that dominate current 
societies. The shortcoming of this general approach is that its measure of political institutions – 
an index of constraints on the executive – can reflect far too many historical episodes which may 
affect the limits rulers had in exercising their power in the distant past and thus be unable to 
provide a clear description of how these norms are set up and adopted.  35 
 
 
4.2. Natural Experiments   
While interesting, these correlations do not provide a reliable test of the determinants of civic 
capital. To do so, the literature has relied on a combination of natural and field experiments. In 
what follows we will provide a brief description of the methodology and the findings.   
 
4.2.1 History    
As discussed in Section 2, large shocks to the benefits of cooperation can induce a change in the 
norms and beliefs that support cooperative behavior. History can provide some natural 
experiments in this sense.  
  One such a shock is represented by the collapse of the Holy Roman Empire at the 
beginning of the second millennium. As the opportunities for trade expanded, the North and 
South of Italy were subjected to two very different treatments. While the South was governed by 
an efficient and autocratic monarchy (the Norman Kings), the North was left in power vacuum. 
In some northern cities, the response to the lack of government was the formation of small 
groups of individuals who agreed with an informal pact to provide mutual help and collaborate to 
solve problems of common interest. Slowly, more stable institutions started to emerge from these 
agreements.  In the mid-twelfth century a new word came into use to describe them: “commune”. 
The word commune is a synonym for republic (res publica, i.e. common property) and is used 
with this meaning. This sense of responsibility for the common good that citizens of independent 
towns developed and consolidated over two centuries of self-government is the “civicness” 
Putnam refers to and the limits to the power of the executive that Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) 
deem necessary for development. 
Putnam (1993) uses this historical episode to justify today’s large differences in civic 
capital between the North and the South of Italy, which we reported in Figures 5 and 6. 
Appealing as it may seem, Putman’s explanation is just an inference based on only two data 
points. In a recent contribution GSZ (2008) try to overcome this problem.  36 
 
Rather than just comparing civic capital between the North and South of Italy GSZ 
exploit variation within the North. As Figure 8 shows, not all major cities located in the North at 
the turn of the first millennium actually became free cities: some did not and either remained 
under the control of the emperor (at least for a while) or fell under the control of one of feudal 
lords that survived the communal experience and that even gained power relatively to the 
emperor. Furthermore, not all cities that became free cities enjoyed independence and self 
government for the same length of time. GSZ exploit this variation to test whether civic capital 
today is affected by a distant episode in history. They find that Center-Northern cities that 
became free cities have significantly higher levels of civic capital today. For example, the 
number of voluntary associations is 25% higher in cities that were free city-states, consistent 
with Putnam conjecture.  
This correlation by itself, however, is insufficient to attribute this variation to historical 
experience. Past history may be a proxy for some unobservable characteristics that affect both 
the chances a city became independent in the middle ages and the level of civic capital today. To 
address this problem GSZ find two instruments that affect the cost of becoming independent at 
that time, but are unlikely to affect the level of civic capital today: whether a city was the seat of 
a Bishop and whether the city had been founded by the Etruscans. The first variable captures the 
variation in the cost of coordination, since it is documented (Tabacco, 1987) that the presence of a 
bishop facilitated the necessary coordination of the prominent local families to provide the public 
goods and made it easier to transform a city into an independent commune.  The second variable 
is a proxy for how easy a city was to defend. Since the Etruscans, a pre Roman civilization, was 
organized as free city states, they chose to locate their cities in positions that were easy to 
defend.  
Using these two instruments GSZ are able to confirm that cities that became a commune 
have more civic capital today. Furthermore, since the affirmation of the Norman Kingdom in the 
South, prevented the formation of free city-states in the South they can then test the validity of 
their instruments, by looking at their effect in the South, where free city-states did not occur. 
That these instruments have no effect in the South suggests as GSZ find is evidence of the 
validity of the exclusion restriction, lending strong support to Putnam conjecture.  37 
 
Nunn and Wantchekon (2009), instead, provide a very interesting historical natural 
experiment of how civic capital can be destroyed. They focus on slave trade to explain mistrust 
within Africa. They argue that today’s level of trust among different African ethnicities is the 
reflection of the past exposure to the risk of being captured and sold as slave in the 18
th and early 
19
th century. Because of the high payoff of selling people to slave traders, indigenous sold even 
people of their same ethnic group, close friends, and relatives – those who are less likely to 
expect to be betrayed and are thus easier to be surprised.  This engendered climate of suspicion – 
Nunn and Wantchekon (2009) argue – may have resulted in an evolution of mistrust towards 
others and towards local leaders.  
To assess the effects of this historical experience Nunn and Wantchekon (2009) use data 
from  the 2005 wave of Afrobarometer – a survey similar to Eurobarometer and the World 
Values Survey that covers 17 African. They find that Africans whose ancestors faced a higher 
chance of being captured and sold as slave today trust their relatives, neighbors, and local 
council less. This conclusion is further strengthened by instrumenting the intensity of slave trade 
with the distance from the coast.  
4.2.2 Geography 
A second source of “natural” shocks to the benefit of cooperation is provided the 
geographical environments. The efficient exploitation of certain natural resources can only be 
achieved if several people, possibly a whole community, are willing to cooperate.  
For example, in mountainous areas where the main crop is slow-growing trees it is 
impossible to support a fragmented land ownership without a very high degree of cooperation, 
since farmers need to take turns in cutting their trees and pool and divide the proceeds. As 
Ostrom (1990) shows, this solution requires a considerable amount of cooperation and mutual 
trust. This experience of cooperation and trust, repeated over centuries, can increase the level of 
civic capital. By contrast, sheep breeding does not require any cooperation to be efficiently 
carried out. Sheppard can do most of the work alone or just with the help of a few relatives. In 
these areas generalized trust is typically low and cooperatives are few.    
An example of this approach is provided by Durante (2009). He shows that areas of 
Europe with higher climate variability have higher level of trust. In his view, this correlation 38 
 
arises because climate variability generates a higher need for insurance, which can only be 
delivered if there is enough cooperation.       
4.3. Field experiments    
An alternative approach to identify the causal determinants of civic capital is fields experiments. 
These experiments have the advantage of a truly exogenous and properly randomized treatment. 
However, they do not have the luxury of sustaining this treatment for a long period of time. To 
the extent civic capital need time to form, these experiments are bound to fail to find any effect.   
One such an experiment took place within the Conditional Cash Transfer program (CCT) 
in Columbia called Familias en Acciòn. As part of its objectives, beneficiary mothers participate 
in the so-called ‘Encuentros de Cuidado’ where they discuss about topics of mutual interest and 
collaboration is encouraged. This experience can foster civic capital if treated people earn the 
benefits of mutual trust through experimentation and extrapolate this knowledge to other 
collective action decisions not directly subsidized by the program.  
To test whether this is actually the case, Attanasio et. al. (2009) compare people’s 
behavior in a public good game between two similar villages, one treated with the CCT program 
for two years and the other not.
10 They find that fraction of people who contribute to the public 
good is 30 percentage points larger in the treated village. This result is consistent with the 
hypothesis that people in the treated village accumulate civic capital which becomes productive 
when an opportunity to use it arises.  
Of course there are caveats here as well. First, the treatment and control, while similar, 
were not randomly selected, though the results Attanasio et al (2009) obtain are robust to 
controlling for observables. Second, it is unclear whether the observed difference in behavior is 
long lasting. What would happen if the program stopped? How long should the program last in 
order for the observed behavior to be engrained into the culture of the beneficiaries? Thus, while 
field experiments may prove useful in addressing some of the questions about the formation of 
                                                 
10 The game was played in two stages. In each stage participant were given a token. They could keep the token or 
contribute it to the public good. Keeping it results in a $5 return; contributing it returns 40 cents for each person that 
contributes his token. Each experiment session gathers 25 people. Thus, if less than 12 contribute not contributing is 
a dominant strategy, whatsoever. Free riding is always return  maximizing. Social and private surplus is maximized 
if all contribute.       39 
 
civic capital, they are unlikely to be able to replace field data that rely on large surveys and 
historical episodes.                      
5. The Economic Effects of Civic Capital 
Civic capital as defined in this paper exhibits strong correlation with level-measures of economic 
development – such as GDP per capita. This is remarkable since economic models have proved 
able to explain at best only half of the massive differences in GDP per capita across countries 
with differences in (traditional) factor endowments. The other half is the Solow residual when 
applied to levels (instead of growth rates) of GDP and identifies the “measure of our ignorance” 
in the cross sectional dimension (see Caselli (2005) for an excellent survey).  
In an early attempt at finding the missing factor that could bridge the “measure of 
ignorance”, Hall and Jones (1999) argue that one should focus on differences across countries in 
what they call social infrastructure, that is the set of institutions and government policies that 
result in “.. an environment that supports productive activities and encourages capital 
accumulation, skill acquisition, invention, and technology transfer”. Obviously, not only formal 
institutions of the sort first emphasized by North (1990) can contribute to provide such an 
environment but also informal mechanisms, including the trust market participants have on each 
other and the cultural norms of respect of others they were educated to follow.  
As Table 7 shows, there is a strong correlation between the measures of social 
infrastructure (as defined empirically by Hall and Jones (1999)) and our measures of civic 
capital. The same is true if we run directly the labor productivity (the dependent variable in Hall 
and Jones (1999)) and our measures of civic capital.  
            The  empirical  challenge  is  to  find convincing sources of exogenous variation in our 
measures of civic capital that can overcome the potential failure of the exogeneity assumption 
either because civic capital may reflect the working of institutions (e.g. trust more where legal 
structure is better), or be correlated with unobserved factors that affect also performance (e.g. 
education quality),  or because it is at least partially reverse-caused by current economic forces 
(Glaeser et. al. 2002).       40 
 
As noticed by Durlauf (2002), one impediment to the search of valid instruments is that 
while these papers  “…often employ instrumental variables to account for the endogeneity of 
social capital..” they “.. typically do not incorporate a separate theory of the determinants of 
social capital formation..” and thus ..” one cannot have much confidence that unobserved 
heterogeneity is absent in the samples under study”.  
   
5.1. Civic capital and identification 
 One of the advantages of narrowing down the definition of social capital to the set of cultural 
norms and beliefs that make cooperation among individuals easier is that it can help pinning 
down the causal economic effects of civic capital by suggesting potential identification 
strategies. As we showed in Section 3, this definition of civic capital lends itself to be 
incorporated into standard economic models that provide explanations of its accumulation which 
can be used to provide identification restrictions when testing the effects of social capital on 
economic outcomes.  
In much of the literature that studies the effect of social capital on economic performance 
a key problem is how to separate the effect of social capital from that of formal institutions. As 
the model by Tabellini (2008) implies, the cultural values that promote cooperation and 
exchange and pro-market institutions are complementary, implying that countries with strong 
values and high trust also choose institutions that support these values making them attractive to 
the population. Hence, in cross-countries estimates it is hard to tell apart the effect of social 
capital on income per capita (or growth) from that of institutions.  
The work by Knack and Keefer (1997) – which has the great merit of having brought to 
economists’ attention the potential relevance of trust beliefs and civic capital for understanding 
cross-country differences in economic success – is a good example of this problem. They use 
cross country variation in GDP levels and growth and in levels of generalized trust and civic 
capital from the WVS (similar to the ones discussed in Section 4) and find that  indeed countries 
with higher GDP per capita and higher growth rates do indeed have higher civic capital a higher 
levels of trust. Needless to say, higher trust does not necessarily reflect an effect of cultural 
norms as it may capture better institutional design: in countries with stronger legal protection it is 41 
 
natural that people trust each other more, and so trust may be picking up the effect of better 
institutions rather than higher cultural capital. Controlling for institutional quality (as they indeed 
do) may not suffice to capture the effect if institutions are not properly measured or some 
relevant dimension of institutions is not controlled for. Instrumenting trust with ethno-linguistic 
diversity, as Knack and Keefer (1997) do, could in principle provide a way out but raises the 
issue of what is the basis for excluding ethno-linguistic diversity from the growth regression and 
for arguing that it is a good causal predictor of cultural capital. Absent a theory of social capital 
formation, it is hard to tell. 
Inspired by the notion of civic capital and the theoretical models of Section 3, the recent 
literature has followed two approaches to deal with this issue. The first relies on the theoretically 
grounded link between past political institutions and current cultural traits to find appropriate 
instruments. The second is based on movers and the idea of “cultural portability”. A third, less 
developed approach that has been followed relies on field experiments. We discuss them in turn.      
 
5.1.1 Past history as a source of instruments   
As discussed in Section 4 long-term historical episodes are a casual source of civic capital 
accumulation and, if properly isolated, they can be good candidates for acting as instruments for 
today norms and beliefs shared by a community. In fact, since culture is transmitted slowly from 
one generation to the next, distant but relevant historical episodes can have predictive power on 
today’s norms and beliefs.  
This is the strategy followed by Tabellini (2009) to identify the effect of civic capital on 
economic growth and development. As we have discussed in Section 4, Tabellini (2009) shows 
that differences across regions of Europe in the current endowment of civic capital can be 
explained with differences in long-term history, such as the literacy rates that prevailed at the end 
of the XIXth century and indicators of political institutions in the period from 1600 to 1850. 
Using these measures as instruments he finds that regions with higher endowment of civic capital 
have higher GDP per capita today and have experienced faster GDP growth. The contribution of 
civic capital is also large as it can, for example, explain much of the difference in GDP per capita 
between Lombardy – one of the most economically developed regions of Italy – and the Italian 42 
 
backward regions in the South, and contribute half of a percentage point to the growth 
differential of the two areas between 1977 and 2001.  
Since Tabellini (2009) uses regional variation and these regions are part of countries with 
common institutional design, he can exclude that civic capital captures the effect of formal 
institutions as they are absorbed by country fixed effects. Furthermore, controls for current levels 
of education and for the historical level of economic development suggest that civic capital is 
unlikely to reflect persistent differences in human capital and in productivity.  What is key for 
identification is that the historical instruments don’t have a direct effect on today’s output but 
affect the latter only because they affected the cultural traits of these populations centuries ago 
which are then reflected – though intergenerational transmission – in today culture. We will 
return to this assumption below.  
Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2008) rely on a similar strategy to identify the effect of 
civic capital on average per capita income. After having shown that past history of communal 
independence explains differences across cities in the North of Italy, they use this variation to 
identify the effect of civic capital on GDP per capita in year 2001, instrumenting today civic 
capital with past history of independence.  Indeed they find that differences in civic capital can 
explain a good fraction of the differences in income per capita across towns in the North of Italy, 
as shown in Figure 9. Since they look at variation across cities of an area that has long shared the 
same formal institutions, they can exclude that differences in civic capital reflect differences in 
institutions rather than in shared values and beliefs. However, while both in Tabellini (2009) and 
GSZ (2008) one can rule out that civic capital reflects differences in formal institutions, one 
cannot exclude that differences in culture across regions capture differences in the actual 
performance of institutions that are formally the same (this possibility is less likely in GSZ 
(2008) since the area they look at is also quite homogeneous along these dimensions).     
There is however a more serious problem with this approach that invests the validity of 
the exclusion restriction for the instrument(s) for civic capital. For the instruments to be valid it 
must be that the historical episodes that built up civic capital did not at the same time foster the 
accumulation of other forms of capital that have lasted up to today and still exert a direct effect 
on income.  For instance, in the GSZ (2008) context, having been a free city in the 13
th century 
may have resulted in accumulated assets of some sort that still directly affect income today, 43 
 
besides affecting it indirectly because of its boost on civic capital. Using the bishop city and the 
Etruscan city indicators which proved to be good instruments for the historical determinants of 
civic capital is not a solution either. In fact, even if they affect civic capital only because they 
facilitated the emergence of the free city (and thus qualify as instruments in a civic capital 
regression), they also boosted all the unobservable assets that may continue to affect a city 
income today (which may invalidate them as instruments in an income regression). The only way 
to account for this is to obtain direct measures of these assets and try to control for them.
11  The 
general point is that historical shocks to civic capital could have also shocked other types of 
capital as persistent as civic capital and which may have an independent, direct effect on income.   
5.1.2 Movers and cultural portability as an identification strategy  
An alternative strategy to identify the effect of civic capital on economic outcomes and separate 
it from the effect that institutions – both their design and their actual functioning – have on the 
economy is to rely on one unique feature of cultural norms and beliefs that is embedded in the 
models of Section 3: once ingrained in the brain of individuals norms and beliefs tend to move 
with them and continue to affect their actions when people locate in a new environment, where 
different norms and beliefs prevail. On the other hand institutions are not portable: they do not 
move with single individuals as they leave their country or region, though they can be 
transplanted when many people move to colonize a new country. Therefore focusing on movers’ 
and using information on the prevailing norms and beliefs in their country of origin one can 
separate the effect of civic capital from that of institutions. The institutions that matter are those 
of the country or region where the person lives; the norms and beliefs that matter – given cultural 
persistence - are also those of the place were the person originates. This approach, known 
sometimes as the epidemiological approach (Fernandez, 2007), has been successfully used in the 
recent emerging literature on culture and economics to identify the effect of other cultural norms 
on economic outcomes e.g. by Carroll et. al (1999), GSZ (2004), Giuliano (2007), Ichino and 
Maggi (2000), and Fernandez and Fogli (2009).
12   
                                                 
11 For instance, GSZ (2008) address this issue by controlling for the most likely type of asset (besides social capital) 
that free cities created and that still generates income: historical attractions and arts that result in a richer tourist 
industry in the city, captured by the number of annual visitors to the city (scaled by population).   
12 Several studies do indeed document that cultural norms and beliefs are carried over when people move and 
persists in the new environment. Rice and Feldman (1997) and Putnam (2000) document that the civic values of US-44 
 
There are two points to notice about this approach. First, since also the norms and beliefs 
of the place where the person interacts may matter for his/her economic decisions, this approach 
is likely to provide a lower bound estimate of the effect of civic capital. Second, the set of norms 
and beliefs that foster cooperation may even be caused by the institutions in the country of origin 
(which would be consistent with Tabellini (2008a) finding that trust attitudes of third generation 
US immigrants is explained by the political institutions prevailing around or before 1900 in the 
ancestor’s country of origin) but if they affect mover’s behavior in the country of destination it is 
because beliefs and norms matter independently of the institutions that forged them.  
Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004) rely on this idea to identify the effect of civic 
capital on financial development, measured by the intensity people rely on financial markets. 
They use data on individual Italian investors and on their reliance on financial instruments, 
knowing where they live and make their decisions as well as their place of birth. This allows 
them to identify the movers. The great variation in civic capital within Italy illustrated in Figures 
5 and 6, offers a good opportunity for testing while the fact that they rely on within country 
variation implies that formal institutions are held constant. Thanks to the presence of movers, 
differences in the actual working of institutions – such as the efficiency of the local courts, which 
may affect people’s beliefs and their choices as well and that was a problematic issue with the 
previous strategy  – can be perfectly controlled for by inserting dummies for the place where 
they live and make decisions. They find that civic capital in the province where movers come 
from has very strong effects on the use and availability of financial contracts in the province 
where they live: people that moved from provinces with higher civic capital make larger 
investments in stocks, rely more on checks to settle transactions and have an easier access to the 
loans market, consistent with this people being willing to take more social risk as they trust more 
and to deserve more credit for being more trustworthy.  
These results help also us understand better the channels through which higher civic 
capital can result in higher GDP per capita: because it fosters financial development, and through 
it, economic growth.  This result is also consistent with Paulson and Osilii (2006) which finds 
                                                                                                                                                             
immigrants are correlated with those in the country of origin of their ancestors and Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 
(2006) show that trust of second generation immigrants to the US varies with the country of origin of the ancestors 
and is strongly correlated with trust currently prevailing their. Uslaner (2008) provides similar evidence but adds 
that the generalized trust of today’s Americans depends more strongly on the trust inherited from their ancestors 
than on the trust of the people they currently live close to. 45 
 
that participation in stock markets of second generation Americans depends on the institutions in 
the ancestors country of origin which have promoted cultural beliefs conducive to higher trust 
and by Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2008) who find that in a sample of  Dutch investors people 
who trust more invest more in stocks.  
In a recent contribution Algan and Cahuc (2008) make an ingenious use of the movers 
approach to obtain time variation in trust which they then use to eliminate the unobserved formal 
and informal institutions that pose identification problems in cross-country regressions. To 
describe this strategy, consider the nature of the problem in a cross country regression of income 
per capita at time t in country c:  
01 2 3 4 ct ct ct c t ct YS X F F v α αα αα =+ + + + + 
where  ct S  is a measure of civic capital such as trust as measured in the WVS, that (by 
assumption) varies across countries and over time,  ct X  is a vector of controls that vary across 
countries and over time and  c F  and  t F  are country and time fixed effects which absorb the 
effects on per capita GDP of time-invariant institutions and factor endowments and aggregate 
time varying productivity. Obviously, what matters for output at time t  is the civic capital 
prevailing at time t, (i.e. the set of norms and beliefs of the generation that is currently active in 
the labor market).  
The problem with this regression is that those norms and beliefs are most likely 
correlated with the contemporaneous error term  ct v  – for instance because positive current 
shocks to productivity, particularly if permanent, also affect the level of trust of the current 
generation. However, due to cultural persistence and the fact that values and priors of the current 
generation (the one responsible for today GDP) are acquired from the previous generation, if one 
could observe the trust of the previous generation – call it 
I
ct S  - one could use it to replace  ct S in 
the GDP per capita regression. Since these are the beliefs of the previous generation and they 
where transmitted when today GDP was not yet produced, it is reasonable to assume they are 
orthogonal to  ct v .  46 
 
The clever idea of Algan and Cahuc (2008) is to use  the attitudes of different cohorts of 
second generation Americans whose ancestors migrated from various countries to obtain an 
estimate of the inherited component of the beliefs of the active generation in each of the 
countries of origin. In fact, the beliefs of, say, today Italians living in Italy, are correlated with 
the beliefs of second generation Americans of Italian origin. However, while the beliefs of the 
Italian population have evolved according to what has happened in Italy meanwhile, those of 
Americans of Italian origin only respond to shocks to the US economy. Hence, it should be the 
case that they are orthogonal to the error term in the GDP regression.  Inherited trust is estimated 
for two (benchmark) periods, 1935-38 and 2000-2003, using data from US General Social 
Survey and information on the age and ancestry of the respondents, under the assumption of a 
generation gap of 25 years.
13  They then attach these estimates to each of the countries in their 
sample and run a regressions for GDP per capita as: 
  01 2 3 4
I
ct ct ct c t ct YS X F F v αα α α α =+ + + + + 
where t includes data on GDP per capita in 1935 and 2000 (using a 10-year centered average).  
Since the regressions include country fixed effects, any persistent difference across 
countries that affects both its productivity and its cultural norms and beliefs – such as the nature 
and quality of its institutions – is captured by these fixed effects and only the time variation in 
inherited trust is used to identify the causal effect of civic capital on income. Controlling also for 
changes in the quality of institutions and changes in education (to make sure that changes in 
inherited attitudes do not reflect remote changes in these variables), they find that civic capital 
has a positive and statistically significant effect on GDP per capita. Furthermore these effects are 
also sizeable, as illustrated in Figure 11, which reproduces Algan and Cahuc (2008) Figure 6, 
                                                 
13  With the information available in the GSS Algan and Cahuc (2008) can identify second, third and fourth 
generation American-born with foreign ancestors. They use the beliefs of all to obtain their estimates of inherited 
trust. Inherited trust in 1935-1938 reflects the beliefs of second generation Americans born before 1910 (i.e. whose 
parents arrived for sure one generation before 1935), of third generation Americans born before 1935 and of fourth 
generation Americans born before 1960. In the same way, inherited attitudes in 2000-2003 are those inherited by: 
second generation Americans born between 1910 and 1975, by third generation born after 1935 and by fourth 
generation Americans born after 1960. 
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which shows the percent change in per capita GDP relatively to the level observed in 2000-2003 
that a country would have experienced if the level of inherited trust in that country were the same 
as the ones inherited by the current Swedes. For instance, GDP per capita in Africa would have 
been 546% higher and  that in Russia and Mexico around 60% higher had these countries 
inherited as much trust as the Swedes, lending support to the famous statement by Kenneth 
Arrow (1972) who wrote “.. it can be plausibly argued that much of the economic backwardness 
in the world can be explained by the lack of mutual confidence" (p. 357).
14         
5.1.3 Using field experiments to identify the effect of civic capital.   
A third and so far less investigated strategy to identify the economic effects of civic capital is to 
rely on field experiments where one obtains both measures of civic values which can be 
contrasted with observed behavior. A good example of how this strategy can be used is offered 
by Karlan (2005) who uses a field experiment conducted on a sample of borrowers that 
participated in the Peruvian microcredit program Foundation for International Community 
Assistance.  
Karlan (2005) first obtains experimental measures of trustworthiness from a trust game as 
discussed in Section 3, and finds that players identified as trustworthier in the game are more 
likely to repay their loans one year later.  This result is consistent with the idea that because civic 
capital disciplines borrowers and investors behaviors, it promotes financial development, and 
through this channel, economic development. Furthermore, since the measures of trustworthiness 
that Karlan (2005) uses are obtained from a field experiment were institutions play no role by 
construction, differences in trustworthiness across individuals can only reflect differences in the 
preferences and values that people have and that result in different incentives to default. This 
evidence further provides support that higher civic capital has economic real effects.  
What is missing in Karlan (2005) is the link between the behaviour of the receiver in the 
trust game and its underlying values. Butler et. al. (2009) provides such a link. They run a trust 
game experiment and in a separate questionnaire they ask participants in the experiment to report 
                                                 
14 Of course, as in GSZ also in this case this strategy is likely to yield a lower bound estimate of civic capital since 
the estimated effects only uses the inherited component of trust.  
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how much effort on a scale between 0 and 10 their parents put in teaching them a set of civic 
values such as always behave as a model citizen (e.g. by not throwing trash on the ground) or be 
fair with others. They find that players whose parents put more efforts in teaching civic values 
are more trustworthy when playing as receivers in the trust game. 
In sum, we believe that much progress has been made to pin down the causal effects of 
civic capital on economic outcomes and identification strategies have benefited from the 
narrower definition of social capital and the simultaneous theoretical advances that have 
followed. None of the strategies is free of problems but they do not seem more serious than the 
ones one meets when addressing issues of causality in other domains – such as, for instance, the 
estimation of production functions. Each of these strategies has its merits and shortcomings; so 
for instance, field experiments are likely to provide more controlled evidence but, while they can 
speak about the channels through which civic capital may affect the economy, they are likely to 
be less useful at providing estimates of its overall effect on a country output. The other two 
approaches, though exposed to stronger exogeneity requirements, are better designed to provide 
such an estimate.  
6. Conclusions 
  The growing literature on social capital has been plagued by ambiguity on what social 
capital is.  This ambiguity has made it difficult for this concept to be fully accepted in the 
mainstream economic debate. In this chapter we propose a narrower definition of social capital 
that satisfies the criteria of an economic definition of capital (Solow, 1995) and clearly 
differentiates social capital from physical and human capital. We argue that this so-defined civic 
capital is an important omitted factor of production. In fact, it can help explain the Solow 
residuals when applied to levels (instead of growth rates) of GDP. 
While we consider this avenue very promising, we are very aware that much remains to 
be done. First of all, our definition is still far from delivering measures that can be readily used in 
national accounts. The most promising component of such a measure is trust. Trust is well-
founded economically, it is easy to measure, and seems to be correlated with the variables of 
interests. Other survey-based measures of values seem less satisfactory. While some outcome-49 
 
based measures look promising, more work needs to be done to obtain reliable and consistent 
measures.  
The second important area for future research is the mechanisms through which civic 
capital accumulates and depreciates. The evidence gathered so far seems to suggest that a 
positive shock to the benefits of cooperation can have effects that last several centuries. What 
ensures such a high degree of persistence, however, remains still unclear. A better understanding 
of these mechanisms is crucial if we want to think about designing policies that might foster the 
formation and preservation of civic capital.  But a better understanding is also crucial in avoiding 
policies that, while producing short term benefits, undermine civic capital, with negative long 
term effects. For example, a tax pardon, which grants immunity for past tax evasions in exchange 
for a small fee, can be a very smart fiscal policy in the short term, since it will increase tax 
revenues without increasing the marginal tax rates, but it might deteriorate the stock of civic 
capital of a nation, with very negative long term consequences.  
  The political economy of civic capital formation is per se a very important and 
unexplored area for future research. In a democracy with periodic elections and frequent 
turnover, the politicians’ horizon will be short, much shorter than the time of formation of civic 
capital. This might explain why it is so difficult for a country to accumulate civic capital and 
why it remains low even among some economically developed countries.  50 
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Figure 1:  Civic capital across countries 
Panel A figure shows the principal component across countries of the indexes 1, 2 and 4 of civicness described in 
Table 1. Panel B shows the principal component of the three indicators of cultural capital respect, obedience and 
control used by Tabellini (2009) and described in Table 1  
 
Panel A. Civic capital    57 
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Panel B: Cultural capital  59 
 
 
Figure 2: Trust beliefs across countries 
The figure shows the proportion of people that when asked the WVS trust question answer that most people can be 
trusted. 
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Figure 3: Trust and cultural values 
Panel A shows the scatter plot and the regression line between generalized trust in the WVS and  principal component of 
civic values; Panel B shows the plot and regression lines between trust and the principal component of the three measures of 
Tabellini n(2009) cultural values.       
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Figure 4: Trust beliefs: density functions by country.  
Source: Butler et. al (2009) based on the European Social Survey Wave II   
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Figure 5: Referenda turnout across Italian provinces 
Voter turnout is a province is the average percentage of people that participated in all the referenda that occurred in 
Italy between 1946 and 1989. Referenda cover a very broad set of issues, ranging from the choice between republic 
and monarchy (1946) to divorce (1974) to abortion (1981), from hunting regulation (1987), to the use of nuclear 
power (1987), to public order measures (1978, 1981).  Darker areas correspond to higher social capital. 
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Figure 6: Blood donation across Italian provinces 
Number of blood bags per million inhabitants; the indicator ranges from  0 to .11; darker areas correspond to 
provinces with more social capital. Source: GSZ (2004) 64 
 
  
Figure 7: Trust beliefs and economic development  
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Figure 8 – Historical map of Italy at around year 1167 
The figure shows the map of Italy at around year 1167. The red line marks the borders of the country that where the 
Holy Roman Empire of Germany. All the towns marked with a full dot were commune.  Towns in red were 
commune that belonged to the Lombard League, those in blue were allied to the Emperor. The green areas mark the 
territories of various Principati and Feudi.  The Southern part of Italy not belonging to the Empire was under the 
Norman Kingdom of Sicily.    
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Figure 10: The effect of social capital on income per capita across  cities in Northern Italy   
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Figure 11: The Causal Effect of Civic capital on per capita GDP 
The figure shows the predicted variations in GDP per capita over the period 2000-2003 in a given country if it had 
the same level of inherited social attitudes as Sweden, as estimated by Algan and Cahuc (2008).    
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Table 1:  Measuring Civic Values  
Values reported are based on the following question: “ Please tell me for each of the following statements whether 
you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between, using this card.” Answers are in the 
range 1-10, with 1 = never justifiable and 10= always be justifiable. We have recoded the answers so that 10 means 
never justifiable and 1 always justifiable.  “Claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled”(var 1). 
“Avoiding a fare on public transport” (var 2). “Cheating on taxes if you have a chance”(var 3). “Accepting a bribe 
in the course of their duties” (var. 4). “Lying in your own interest”(var 5). “Throwing away litter in a public 
space”(var 6). “Speeding over the limit in build up areas”(var 7). 
 
Panel A 
Civic capital measures 
Mean Median  Sd  N.  of 
observatio
ns 
N. of 
countries 
covered 
1. Claiming government benefits you are not 
entitled to   8.70   2.20  108,829  79 
2. Avoiding a fare on public transport  8.53   2.40  90,977  64 
3. Cheating on taxes  8.72   2.25  111,490  80 
4. Accept a bribe  9.30   1.68  113,190  81 
5. Lying in your own interest   8.20   2.23  40,386  33 
6. Throwing away litter in a public place  9.16   1.63  40,674  33 
7. Speeding over the limit in build-up areas   8.71   1.74  40,510  33 
8. Principal component of civic values 1,3 & 4  
       
         
Tabellini (2009) cultural capital indicators 
       
1. Respect  0.69   0.46  118,319  81 
2. Obedience  0.38   0.49  118,315  81 
3. Control  6.67   2.51  110,484  80 
4. Principal component of norms  -5.86e-09      1.05  110,308  80 69 
 
         
Main beliefs 
       
Generalized trust  0.27        0.44  114,203    81 
Fairness    0.42       0.49  49,872  37 
 
Panel B: cross correlations among civic capital measures 
Civic Variable 
1 
Gov. 
benefits 
2 
Avoid a 
fare 
3 
Cheat on 
taxes 
4 
Accept 
bribe 
5 
Lying 
6 
Littering 
7 
Speeding 
8 
PC 1,3&4 
1. Claiming gov. 
benefits   1            
2. Avoid a fare   0 . 2 8   1          
3. Cheat on taxes  0.43  0.37  1       
4. Accept a bribe  0.32  0.34  0.39  1      
5. Lying in own 
interest   0.30 0.37  0.44  0.40  1       
6. Littering  0.23 0.34  0.21  0.30 0.27  1     
7. Speeding   0.24 0.38  0.30  0.31 0.29 0.34  1   
8. PC 1,3 & 4   0.73 0.45  0.82  0.74 0.50 0.32 0.37  1 
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Table 2. Measures of civic capital  
Country name 
Claim government
benefits  Cheat on taxes  Accept a bribe 
Principal 
component 
of civic 
values 
greece 6.96 7.84 9.07 -0.75
indonesia 7.12 9.46 9.55 -0.11
mexico 7.28 8.69 8.87 -0.49
philippines 7.40 7.84 7.66 -1.10
peru 7.51 8.89 9.28 -0.25
belarus 7.52 6.78 7.91 -1.31
france 7.62 7.96 8.92 -0.59
chile 7.67 8.83 8.95 -0.34
armenia 7.76 7.32 8.87 -0.77
brazil 7.80 7.41 6.98 -1.36
estonia 7.80 7.82 9.07 -0.53
algeria 7.98 8.99 9.54 -0.01
macedonia 8.01 8.70 9.51 -0.04
venezuela 8.02 9.18 9.38 -0.02
slovakia 8.09 8.85 8.08 -0.53
georgia 8.09 8.26 9.25 -0.29
luxembourg 8.13 7.65 9.18 -0.47
slovenia 8.18 8.66 9.22 -0.17
ukraine 8.20 7.59 8.98 -0.53
singapore 8.23 8.96 9.25 -0.08
iran   8.30 9.53 9.74 0.28
el salvador  8.31 9.09 9.53 0.08
montenegro 8.37 8.45 9.67 -0.01
argentina 8.40 9.12 9.73 0.19
belgium 8.45 7.39 9.02 -0.5271 
 
lithuania 8.51 7.16 8.92 -0.62
azerbaijan 8.58 7.38
8.14 -0.78
spain 8.62 8.75 9.35 0.01
taiwan   8.63 9.04 9.43 0.12
poland 8.64 8.86 9.47 0.09
south africa  8.65 8.77 9.09 -0.07
finland 8.65 8.45 9.56 0.00
india 8.66 8.86 9.12 0.00
switzerland 8.67 8.35 9.41 -0.07
russian 8.75 8.02 9.22 -0.21
puerto rico  8.81 8.99 9.67 0.23
dominic rep  8.81 9.05 9.11 0.10
united states  8.83 8.78 9.44 0.09
china 8.87 9.43 9.66 0.34
vietnam 8.87 9.69 9.85 0.49
serbia 8.88 8.91 9.71 0.25
latvia 8.88 8.64 9.32 0.03
Austria 8.91 8.90 9.43 0.14
Japan 8.91 9.54 9.47 0.33
Sweden 8.92 8.58 9.15 -0.04
north Ireland  8.92 8.64 9.44 0.09
Portugal 8.95 8.56 9.22 -0.01
Germany 9.00 8.63 9.06 -0.04
Uganda 9.01 7.42 8.76 -0.47
united kingdom  9.03 8.57 9.22 0.01
Nigeria 9.03 8.97 9.09 0.07
Colombia 9.05 9.08 9.51 0.25
Albania 9.08 9.12 8.62 -0.03
Italy 9.12 8.61 9.50 0.15
Canada 9.12 8.98 9.45 0.22
new Zealand  9.13 8.69 9.54 0.19
Bulgaria 9.17 9.01 9.37 0.22
Ireland 9.17 8.71 9.60 0.21
Romania 9.18 8.21 9.48 0.03
Egypt 9.18 9.42 9.86 0.49
Uruguay 9.19 9.24 9.71 0.40
czech republic  9.19 8.98 8.82 0.03
Morocco 9.20 9.75 9.86 0.59
Iceland 9.25 8.77 9.73 0.29
Australia 9.29 8.84 9.73 0.32
Zimbabwe 9.29 9.44 9.77 0.50
bosnia   9.33 9.24 9.63 0.40
Jordan 9.36 9.49 9.88 0.57
Hungary 9.36 8.91 8.41 -0.09
Norway 9.36 8.29 9.68 0.17
Croatia 9.38 8.26 9.29 0.03
Pakistan 9.47 9.81 9.85 0.6872 
 
Netherland 9.51 8.26 9.44 0.11
Denmark 9.62 9.00 9.85 0.49
Malta 9.64 9.47 9.90 0.63
Bangladesh 9.65 9.94 9.97 0.79
Turkey 9.76 9.82 9.88 0.75
Israel 
   9.58 0.00
Mean 8.68 8.70 9.29 -0.02
Standard deviation  0.65 0.68 0.53 0.43
Correlation with  
principal component  0.75 0.86 0.87
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Table 3. The trust matrix  
 
 Trust  from:   
  Aus Bel UK Den NL Fin Fra Ger Gre Ire  Ita Nor Por Spa Swe  Average 
Aus  3,56 2,83 2,89 3,22 2,90 3,29 2,70 2,98 2,32  2,93  2,66 . 2,13  2,65  3,53  2,90 
Bel 2,95  3,28 2,91 3,18 3,18 3,07 3,07 2,84 2,60 2,93 2,64 3,18 2,66 2,73 3,23  2,96 
UK 2,61  2,84  3,29 3,22 3,00 3,18 2,55 2,69 2,34 2,81 2,51 3,27 2,66 2,31 3,43  2,85 
Den 2,95  3,01  3,13  3,39 3,29 3,30 2,96 2,97 2,56 2,99 2,70 3,53 2,66 2,73 3,57  3,05 
NL 2,95  2,90  3,16  3,33  3,28 3,14 2,94 2,90 2,55 3,00 2,77 3,26 2,70 2,85 3,33  3,00 
Fin  2,94 2,92 2,98 3,20 3,25 3,69 
2,91 2,85 2,42 2,92 2,78  .  2,18 2,71 3,49  2,95 
Fra 2,62  2,92  2,32 2,86 2,72 2,92 3,18 2,85 2,78 2,81 2,66 2,93 2,91 2,37 3,04  2,79 
Ger  3,09 2,75 2,62 3,12 2,84 2,89 2,74 3,50 2,31 2,78 2,63 2,99 2,54 2,66 3,13  2,84 
Gre 2,52  2,45  2,54  2,61 2,59 2,68 2,53 2,51 3,21 2,50 2,40 2,52 2,41 2,47 2,88  2,59 
Ire 2,55  2,75  2,61  3,02  2,80 2,92 2,72 2,59 2,55 3,33 2,37 3,01 2,51 2,57 3,26  2,77 
Ita  2,43 2,40 2,51 2,53 2,35 2,51 2,43 2,36 2,33 2,65 2,80 2,65 2,55 2,61 2,81  2,53 
Nor  3,00 2,91 3,06 3,50 3,30 3,48 2,97 2,92 2,40 2,93 2,78  . 2,22  2,79  3,65  2,99 
Por  2,50 2,53 2,74 2,67 2,74 2,67 2,59 2,48 2,60 2,65 2,32 2,60 3,29 2,51 2,97  2,66 
Spa  2,58 2,59 2,47 2,66 2,64 2,61 2,68 2,66 2,71 2,64 2,64 2,56 2,59 3,32 2,86  2,68 
Swe  3,05 2,99 3,03 3,41 3,34 3,35 2,99 2,99 2,51 2,92 2,89  .  2,24 2,84 3,59 3,01 
Average 2,82  2,80  2,82  3,06  2,95 3,05 2,80 2,81 2,55 2,85 2,64 2,95 2,55 2,67 3,25     
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Table 4: Personalized versus generalized trust 
Country 
Trust 
Family 
Trust people 
Know personally 
Trust  
Neighborhood 
Trust 
stranger 
Generalized 
trust  Family - stanger 
Personally know 
-stranger 
Neighborhood -
stranger 
France 3.74 3.62 3.12 2.32 0.19 1.42 1.30 0.80
Britain 3.84 3.48 2.96 2.35 0.30 1.49 1.13 0.61
West Germany  3.77 3.19 2.84 2.10 0.41 1.67 1.09 0.74
Italy 3.86 2.72 2.73 1.93 0.29 1.92 0.79 0.80
Netherlands 3.54 3.16 2.82 2.03 0.44 1.51 1.12 0.79
Spain 3.91 3.25 2.92 2.11 0.20 1.79 1.14 0.81
Usa 3.71 3.26 2.90 2.30 0.40 1.40 0.96 0.60
Mexico 3.68 2.84 2.50 1.68 0.16 1.99 1.16 0.82
South Africa  3.82 3.01 2.86 2.04 0.17 1.78 0.97 0.82
Australia 3.82 3.40 2.89 2.39 0.48 1.43 1.01 0.49
Sweden 3.93 3.47 3.29 2.69 0.68 1.24 0.79 0.60
Argentina 3.87 3.18 2.84 2.07 0.17 1.80 1.12 0.77
Finland 3.90 3.39 3.21 2.47 0.59 1.44 0.92 0.75
South Korea  3.87 2.97 2.76 1.87 0.30 2.00 1.10 0.89
Poland 3.70 2.96 2.80 2.06 0.19 1.64 0.90 0.75
Switzerland 3.79 3.28 3.01 2.41 0.51 1.38 0.87 0.61
Brazil 3.59 2.68 2.48 1.64 0.09 1.94 1.04 0.84
Chile 3.82 2.73 2.56 1.67 0.12 2.14 1.06 0.89
India 3.83 3.04 3.21 2.03 0.23 1.82 1.01 1.18
East Germany  3.77 3.16 2.88 1.97 0.28 1.81 1.19 0.91
Slovenia 3.79 2.99 2.70 1.71 0.18 2.09 1.28 0.99
Bulgaria 3.89 3.13 2.90 1.98 0.22 1.91 1.15 0.92
Romania 3.73 2.54 2.47 1.76 0.20 1.98 0.79 0.71
China 3.87 3.02 3.12 1.91 0.52 1.96 1.11 1.21
Taiwan 3.86 3.11 2.92 2.06 0.24 1.80 1.04 0.86
Turkey 3.95 2.93 2.86 1.77 0.05 2.18 1.16 1.0975 
 
Ukraine 3.76 2.97 2.84 1.91 0.28 1.87 1.07 0.93
Russia 3.90 3.03 2.73 1.75 0.27 2.15 1.27 0.98
Perù 3.69 2.43 2.20 1.49 0.06 2.19 0.94 0.71
Ghana 3.64 2.76 2.73 1.88 0.09 1.75 0.87 0.85
Moldova 3.78 2.84 2.53 1.71 0.18 2.08 1.13 0.82
Thailand 3.78 2.82 3.04 1.90 0.42 1.88 0.92 1.14
Indonesia 3.79 3.05 2.89 2.00 0.43 1.80 1.05 0.89
Vietnam 3.88 2.85 3.20 2.10 0.52 1.79 0.74 1.09
Colombia 3.79 2.74 2.56 1.71 0.14 2.08 1.03 0.85
Serbia 3.91 3.11 2.79 2.01 0.15 1.90 1.09 0.77
New Zealand  3.90 3.57 3.11
 
0.51
 
3.57 3.11
Egypt 3.96 3.33 3.42 2.09 0.18 1.87 1.24 1.33
Morocco 3.89 3.11 3.28 1.89 0.13 2.00 1.22 1.39
Jordan 3.96 3.00 3.24 1.95 0.31 2.02 1.05 1.29
Cyprus 3.86 3.04 2.75 1.66 0.13 2.19 1.38 1.09
Trinidad 3.66 2.95 2.59 1.84 0.04 1.82 1.11 0.74
Andorra 3.80 3.13 2.42 1.90 0.21 1.90 1.23 0.52
Malaysia 3.84 2.85 2.94 1.78 0.09 2.06 1.07 1.16
Burkina Faso  3.79 2.73 2.92 2.01 0.15 1.78 0.72 0.91
Ethiopia 3.86 2.80 3.12 2.08 0.24 1.77 0.72 1.04
Mali 3.90 3.12 3.18 2.23 0.17 1.68 0.89 0.95
Rwanda 3.69 2.99 3.13 2.19 0.05 1.50 0.80 0.94
Zambia 3.59 2.67 2.66 1.75 0.12 1.84 0.92 0.91
 76 
 
Table 5: Civic capital and economic development 
A. Productivity 
      
VARIABLES  Real GDP per 
capita 
Real GDP per 
worker 
Real GDP per 
capita 
Real  GDP per 
worker 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
      
Trust toward strangers  22,184***  37,183***     
 [6,331]  [11,329]     
Violation -144.8***  -239.6*** -133.1***  -227.4** 
  [44.90] [82.90] [47.93] [90.51] 
Principal component civic values -701,7  -1.138  -189,6  -139,9 
  [986.4] [1,814] [967.4] [1,814] 
Generalized trust       26,044**  36,470* 
     [11,135]  [19,970] 
Constant -25,587**  -38,744*  11,775***  25,946*** 
 [12,535]  [22,553]  [3,392]  [6,199] 
      
Observations  42 42 45 45 
R-squared 0,31  0,264  0,257  0,193 
Notes: GDP figures refer to 2007 (Source: Penn World Table 6.3). Trust and civic values data are from the 
World Values Survey. Violation is the number of parking violations per UN diplomat (Source: Fisman and 
Miguel, 2010).  
Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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B.  Government efficiency 
VARIABLES Bureaucratic  delays  Corruption  Tax  compliance  GADP 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7)  (8) 
Trust toward strangers  2.321***  1.497** 4.765***  3.720*** 1.550**  0.869  0.327***  0.237*** 
  [0.505] [0.537] [0.946] [0.717] [0.626] [0.560] [0.0984] [0.0449] 
Violation -0.0134***  -0.00504  -0.0218** -0.00873 0.00119 0.00691*  -0.00171** -0.00018 
  [0.00387] [0.00430] [0.00882] [0.00655] [0.00428] [0.00387] [0.000763] [0.000336] 
Principal component civic values  0.073  0.0186 -0.17 -0.122*  -0.214 -0.254 0.0301  -0.00029 
 [0.223]  [0.149]  [0.110]  [0.0699]  [0.206] [0.166] [0.0342] [0.0130] 
Log  of  GDP    0.820***  1.117***  0.624***    0.132*** 
   [0.260]  [0.259]  [0.188]    [0.0144] 
Constant 0.136  -6.105*** -2.89  -11.46*** -0.129 -4.777*** 0.0403  -1.027*** 
 [0.974]  [2.040]  [1.854]  [1.875]  [1.252] [1.657]  [0.187]  [0.127] 
            
Observations  28 28 38 38 27 27  37  37 
R-squared  0.359  0.604 0.428 0.676 0.175 0.425  0.349  0.85 
Notes: Bureaucratic delays (red tape) data is the average of the years between 1972 and 1995. The scale is from 0 to 10 and low 
ratings indicate lower levels of red tape in the bureaucracy of the country (Source: La Porta et al., 1999). Corruption refers to 
corruption in government. Low ratings indicate "high government officials are likely to demand special payments" and "illegal 
payments are generally expected toward lower levels of government" in the form of "bribes connected with import and export 
licenses, exchange controls, tax assessment, policy protection or loans". The scale is from 0 to 10 and data refer to the average of 
the years between 1982 and 1995 (Source: La Porta et al., 1999). Data for tax compliance refer to 1995. The scale is from 0 to 6, 
where higher scores indicate higher compliance (Source: La Porta et al.,1999). GADP is the index of government anti-diversion 
policies (Source: Hall and Jones, 1999). It is an equal-weighted average of 5 categories for the years 1986-1995: i) law and order, 
ii) bureaucratic quality, iii) corruption, iv) risk of expropriation, v) government repudiation of contracts. Each of the 5 categories 
has higher values for governments with more effective policies for supporting production.  The index is measured on a scale from 
0 to 1. Trust and civic values data are from the World Values Survey. Violation is the number of parking violations per UN 
diplomat (Source: Fisman and Miguel, 2010).  
Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 78 
 
Table 6:  Where does civic capital come from?  
A. The sources of trust 
VARIABLES Trust  toward  strangers 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Enrollment rate in 1920  0.00660***  0.00646***  0.00417*  0.00474** 
 [0.00140]  [0.00137]  [0.00226]  [0.00229] 
Ethnic fractionalization    -0,249  -0.340**  -0.303** 
   [0.163]  [0.152]  [0.139] 
Years of democracy since independence      0,00147  0.00186* 
     [0.00120]  [0.000991] 
Percentage Catholic        -0.00269** 
       [0.00101] 
Percentage Muslim        0,000141 
       [0.00112] 
Log of GDP  -0.0786*  -0.0983**  -0.110**  -0.103** 
 [0.0429]  [0.0453]  [0.0432]  [0.0490] 
Constant 2.523***  2.801***  2.933***  2.896*** 
 [0.368]  [0.411]  [0.387]  [0.456] 
        
Observations 44  43  42  42 
R-squared 0,245  0,285  0,313  0,449 
Notes: Trust figures are from the World Values Survey. Enrollment rate is the fraction of people aged 5 to 14 enrolled in primary 
education in 1920 (Source: Benavot and Riddle, 1988). Years of democracy since independence is the number of years since 
independence in which the country is democratic. A country is defined as democratic in a specific year if in that year the variable 
polity2 in the Polity IV dataset is strictly positive. Ethnic fractionalization reflects the probability that two randomly selected 
people from a given country will not belong to the same ethno-linguistic group (Source: Alesina et al., 2003). The higher the 
number, the more fractionalized the society. The definition of ethnicity involves a combination of racial and linguistic 
characteristics. Percentage Muslim and percentage Catholic identify the percentage of the population in each country that 
belonged to Roman Catholic and Muslim religion in 1980 (Source: La Porta et al., 1999).  
Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
B. The sources of respect for rules 
VARIABLES Violation 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 79 
 
      
Enrollment rate in 1920  -0.216**  -0.197**  -0,145  -0,0841 
 [0.0917]  [0.0920]  [0.113]  [0.106] 
Ethnic fractionalization    16,24 15,93 16,44 
   [10.17]  [10.34]  [10.03] 
Years of democracy since independence      -0,0641  -0,0357 
     [0.0492]  [0.0496] 
Percentage Catholic        -0,0253 
       [0.0439] 
Percentage Muslim        0.165* 
       [0.0919] 
Log of GDP  -4.355**  -2,334  -1,726  -1,356 
  [1.782] [1.836] [1.906] [2.010] 
Constant 60.95***  35.13**  30.96*  22,07 
  [15.71] [17.70] [18.17] [19.09] 
      
Observations  131 130 128 128 
R-squared  0,114 0,124 0,128 0,168 
 
Notes: Violation is the number of parking violations per UN diplomat (Source: Fisman and Miguel, 2010). Enrollment rate is the 
fraction of people aged 5 to 14 enrolled in primary education in 1920 (Source: Benavot and Riddle, 1988). Years of democracy 
since independence is the number of years since independence in which the country is democratic. A country is defined as 
democratic in a specific year if in that year the variable polity2 in the Polity IV dataset is strictly positive. Ethnic fractionalization 
reflects the probability that two randomly selected people from a given country will not belong to the same ethno-linguistic group 
(Source: Alesina et al., 2003). The higher the number, the more fractionalized the society. The definition of ethnicity involves a 
combination of racial and linguistic characteristics. Percentage Muslim and percentage Catholic identify the percentage of the 
population in each country that belonged to Roman Catholic and Muslim religion in 1980 (Source: La Porta et al., 1999).  
Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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C. The sources of moral norms 
VARIABLES  Principal component of civic values 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
      
Enrollment rate in 1920  0.0207  0.0197  0.00908  0.0149 
 [0.0124]  [0.0128]  [0.00893]  [0.0100] 
Ethnic fractionalization    -0.687  -0.948  -1.075 
    [0.657] [0.661] [0.663] 
Years of democracy since 
independence     0.00844  0.00914 
     [0.00919]  [0.00978] 
Percentage  Catholic      -0.0092 
      [0.00996] 
Percentage  Muslim      0.00878* 
      [0.00486] 
Log of GDP  -0.44  -0.458  -0.55  -0.506 
  [0.437] [0.439] [0.534] [0.517] 
Constant  3.548 3.982 4.821 4.332 
  [3.555] [3.521] [4.355] [4.303] 
      
Observations  46 45 44 44 
R-squared  0.055 0.058 0.084 0.155 
 
Civic values data are from the World Values Survey. Enrollment rate is the fraction of people aged 5 to 14 enrolled in primary 
education in 1920 (Source: Benavot and Riddle. 1988). Years of democracy since independence is the number of years since 
independence in which the country is democratic. A country is defined as democratic in a specific year if in that year the variable 
polity2 in the Polity IV dataset is strictly positive. Ethnic fractionalization reflects the probability that two randomly selected 
people from a given country will not belong to the same ethno-linguistic group (Source: Alesina et al.. 2003). The higher the 
number. the more fractionalized the society. The definition of ethnicity involves a combination of racial and linguistic 
characteristics. Percentage Muslim and percentage Catholic identify the percentage of the population in each country that 
belonged to Roman Catholic and Muslim religion in 1980 (Source: La Porta et al.. 1999). Robust standard errors in brackets. *** 
p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1. 
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Table 7: Civic Capital and Social Infrastructure 
 
 
 